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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20010345-CA 
v. : 
SCOTT ALAN WRIGHT , : 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for operation of a clandestine laboratory, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(a) and (b), -(5)(d) (Supp. 2000), 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Pat B. Brian, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The sole question on appeal is: 
Whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing where the 
undisclosed information was unremarkable in light of defendant's guilt for a serious offense? 
"In ruling on an ineffective assistance claim following a Rule 23B hearing, 'we defer 
to the trial court's findings of fact, but review its legal conclusions for correctness.'" State 
v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 289 (Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 
88 (Utah 1999). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The following constitutional provision is determinative of this case: 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance 
precursor or of laboratory equipment with intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1) (a) and (b) 
(Supp. 2000) (R. 30). The charge was enhanced to a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (d), (f), and (g) (Supp. 2000), based on allegations that defendant 
intended to operate the laboratory within 500 feet of a residence, that the illegal operation 
actually produced a controlled substance, and that the operation was intended to produce 
methamphetamine (R. 31-32). 
Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense charged and to only the enhancement charging 
operation of the laboratory within 500 feet of a residence (R. 142-50; 176:1-9). The 
sentencing court sentenced defendant to a five-to-life term, with 170 days credit for time 
2 
served (R. 152-53,155-58). Defendant timely appealed to this Court, which transferred this 
first degree felony case to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 159, 164). That court, in turn, 
transferred the case back to this Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2002) (R. 
168). This Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review defendant's appeal of his guilty 
plea because his motion to withdraw was untimely, and so dismissed that portion of the 
appeal; however, it retained jurisdiction to consider defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance at sentencing. State v. Wright, 2002 UT App 180 (per curiam) (memorandum 
decision). 
Represented by new counsel, defendant moved, under rule 23B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, for a remand to the district court for findings of fact stemming from his 
claim that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing (R. 184). This Court granted the motion 
(R. 181). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Preliminary Hearing 
On March 10,2000, Detective Derrick Goodwin of the Sandy City Police Department, 
received information that Josh Corbett might be dealing methamphetamine from his 
residence, one part of a duplex (R. 174:6-8). The residence was part of a duplex (R. 174:37). 
Detective Goodwin spoke with Corbett, who agreed to talk after receiving his Miranda rights 
(R. 174:9-11). Following a conversation with Corbett, Detective Goodwin found 
methamphetamine and other items associated with a clandestine laboratory in Corbett's 
vehicle and drugs on his person (R. 174:11, 26). Corbett also admitted that there were 
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additional laboratory items in his home (R. 174:12). Although Corbett was willing to 
consent to a search of his home, Detective Goodwin decided to obtain a search warrant 
because other persons also resided in the premises (R. 174:12). 
Detective Goodwin obtained a search warrant and searched Corbett's home with as 
many as twenty Sandy City narcotics officers (R. 174:12,33). The search uncovered found 
a partial, actively operating clandestine laboratory in the upstairs, northeast bedroom (R. 
174:13, 15). Concerned that the premises were dangerous, all of the occupants of the house 
and tactical officers were evacuated, leaving only the certified laboratory personnel (R. 
174:14). Among the occupants were defendant, a woman, and two or three small children 
(R. 174:14). Defendant and Orville Dorius, owner of the duplex, were found in the garage, 
which contained items consistent with a clandestine laboratory (R. 174:15, 35-37). 
Approximately one year earlier, the lessee of the adjoining apartment of the duplex had been 
arrested for possession of a clandestine lab, and four to five months earlier police had 
investigated those premises on a drug-related matter (R. 174:35-37). 
Detective Kelly Cramer of the DEA Metropolitan Task Force and Special Agent Kim 
Cavanaugh of the Criminal Investigation Bureau processed the clandestine laboratory (R. 
174:40-42; State's Ex. 2). They found about 100 items associated with a clandestine 
laboratory in the garage, in the bedrooms upstairs and in a crawl space beneath the stairway 
and throughout the house (R. 174:42,47-48). Officer Jeff Payne, a team leader on the DEA 
Metropolitan Narcotics Task Force, examined photographs taken at the residence and 
explained in detail that the clandestine laboratory was in "set-up operational fashion" to 
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specifically manufacture methamphetamine (R. 174:72-80, 83, 85; State's Ex. 2). Among 
these items were "numerous" reaction vessels and other laboratory equipment necessary to 
the manufacture of methamphetamine and disposal of exhausted reactants (R. 174:17-20,77-
82; State's Ex. 2 and 3). Officers also found red phosphorus, iodine, pseudoephedrine, 
acetone, isopropyl alcohol, sodium hydroxide, and muriatic acid - - all critical to the 
manufacture of methamphetamine - - and the end-product, methamphetamine (R. 174:17-20, 
77-78, 83-86). 
After receiving a Miranda warning, defendant acknowledged that he resided in the 
northeast bedroom (R. 174:16-17,35). While the warrant was being executed, the occupants 
of the house were detained in the garage (R. 174:64). Detective Shaun Brown overheard 
defendant trying to calm one of the children, explaining that he (defendant) was responsible 
for the police being there because he had done something wrong (R. 174:64-65). Later, 
defendant admitted to the detective that a blue jug in one of the upstairs rooms contained 
'Very hazardous" by-products of cooking methamphetamine (R. 174:66). Defendant also 
indicated that there were jugs containing methaline waste product, and, as one of the agents 
approached a black bag in the garage, defendant warned him that it contained "bad stuff (R. 
174:66-67). Seventy-two of the clandestine laboratory items were found in defendant's 
bedroom, including methamphetamine one step from the completed product (R. 174:16-17, 
84-85). 
Detective Goodwin conservatively estimated that there were at least six houses within 
a 500-foot radius of defendant's residence (R. 174:18). 
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Presentence Investigation Report 
Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense charged and to the enhancement charging 
operation of the laboratory within 500 feet of a residence (R. 142-50; 176:1-9). The trial 
court ordered that a PSI be prepared (R. 176:8). 
Defendant represented to the AP&P investigator that shortly after allowing Corbett 
to move into the duplex he became aware that Corbett was cooking methamphetamine 
(R:173:3).! Defendant generally represented to the investigator that he had no part in the 
clandestine laboratory, but acknowledged that he was wrong in allowing the operation and 
that he regularly ingested methamphetamine produced by Corbett (R: 173:3). Defendant had 
numerous drug and other charges on his juvenile record and three adult convictions prior to 
the current offense (R: 173:5-6). Defendant represented his childhood as "rough" (R: 173:7). 
His mother died in an automobile accident when he was three years old and his father, who 
was "stern," was an alcoholic (R: 173:7). Defendant claimed to have had three different step-
mothers (R: 173:7). He attended high school until the twelfth grade (R: 173:8). He attempted 
suicide while in high school; he denied ever being physically or sexually abused (R: 173:9). 
Defendant reported alcohol use from the age of fifteen to nineteen and a history of drug 
abuse, especially extensive with methamphetamine beginning at sixteen (R: 173:9). 
Defendant's sister believed that defendant had been depressed for several years and that he 
had been abusing methamphetamine for the last six years (R: 173:11). Based on the risks 
posed by methamphetamine manufacture and defendant's knowledge that it was being 
1
 The PSI is in an envelope noted as record "173." 
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produced and distributed, the investigator thought that a significant term of incarceration was 
warranted (R: 173:12). However, based on defendant's favorable attitude and 
acknowledgment of his drug problem and desire for treatment, the investigator thought that 
inpatient substance abuse treatment should follow a term of incarceration (R: 173:12). 
Accordingly, AP&P recommended that defendant serve one year in jail without credit for 
time served, followed by intensive inpatient substance abuse treatment at Odyssey House 
(PSI, at "Agency Recommendation"). 
Sentencing 
At sentencing, defendant's counsel, Ms. Debra Kreeck Mendez, indicated that she had 
received the presentence report (PSI) the night before sentencing (R. 175:3).2 Counsel 
reviewed the PSI, went over it with defendant, and notified the court that corrections need 
to be made (R. 175:3). Judge Pat B. Brian, the sentencing judge, asked counsel to identify 
the errors and readily assented to correct them (R. 175:3). Counsel first noted that, after 
speaking with defendant and his father, the juvenile record incorrectly stated that defendant's 
marijuana possession on February 18, 1987 (PSI, at 5) was for 100 pounds, rather than for 
an eighth of a pound (R. 175:3-4). The court stated that it would not consider the alleged 
error at sentencing (R. 175:4). Counsel next pointed out an error in defendant's mother's 
former employment status (PSI, at 7), which the court corrected (R. 175:4). Last, counsel 
noted that defendant's mother died when he was five, rather than when he was three, which 
the court also corrected (R. 175:4). 
2
 The transcript of the sentencing hearing is attached at Addendum A. 
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The prosecutor argued that the recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole 
(AP&P) in the PSI that defendant should serve only a year in prison was too lenient 
considering that defendant had pleaded guilty to a first degree felony (R. 175:4-5). In 
support, the prosecutor offered the photographs received at the preliminary hearing, which 
showed the substantial extent of the clandestine laboratory and the presence of two children 
when the warrant was executed (R. 175:5-8). The prosecutor argued that defendant had 
essentially admitted at the scene that he was an active participant, that the offense in this case 
would have been filed in federal court if the chemical substances at the scene had been 
weighed, and that based on intelligence and drug busts of Orville Dorius, owner of the other 
half of the duplex, defendant was also likely selling methamphetamine in addition to 
manufacturing it (R. 175:8-9). Defendant's active participation in drug activity was further 
suggested by his living with Corbett who had admitted selling drugs (R. 175:9). 
Additionally, defendant was discovered making "homemade booze" while in jail (R. 175:10-
11). Based on defendant's juvenile court history and his prior drug involvement, the 
prosecutor urged that defendant be sentenced to prison (R. 175:9-10). 
Ms. Mendez first responded that officers associated with the Dorius matter informed 
her that defendant had nothing to do with that case (R. 175:11). She argued that Corbett, not 
defendant, was selling drugs, that defendant's role in the clandestine laboratory was minor 
(R. 175:12). She acknowledged that defendant was, nevertheless, guilty because he had 
provided a place to cook drugs (R. 175:12). When the court asked if she truly believed that, 
counsel answered, "I do believe that" (R. 175:12). She indicated that she and other attorneys 
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at Salt Lake Legal Defender had "struggled" with the breadth of the statute and had "gone 
over it backwards and forwards" to mitigate its breadth (R. 175:12-13). She stated that 
defendant, with the help of his father, had actually been moving out of the house and had not 
stayed there the night the warrant was executed, all evidenced by the photographs (R. 
175:13). She argued that Orville Dorius, not defendant, was operating the clandestine 
laboratory behind a locked door to defendant's bedroom (R. 175:14). She claimed the 
photographs showing the children on the premises were prejudicial because his girlfriend had 
brought them into the house unbeknownst to him, that he had tried to calm the children, and 
had taken responsibility for the offense (R. 175:13-14). She argued that in comparison to 
Corbett's activities and Dorius's federal drug charges, defendant's record was not 
particularly bad (R. 175:14). She pleaded for the court's mercy, noting that defendant had 
been in jail for a long time, that his head was free of drugs and clear for the first time since 
his wife had left him in 1998, and that he had consistently worked and paid as much as fifty 
percent of his income in child support despite his drug problem (R. 175:14). Counsel had 
spoken with defendant's family and others, who asserted that defendant had remained an 
"emotional father for his children," who was failing financially only "towards the end" (R. 
175:14-15). Counsel minimized defendant's involvement compared with that of Corbett, 
whom she suggested had arranged favorable treatment for himself by turning defendant in 
(R. 175:15-16). Counsel pointed to three rows of supportive people (R. 175:16). She 
recounted for the court that defendant had had a "hard time of it": "His mother died. His 
father had been involved with methamphetamine and has had to really fight it" (R. 175:16). 
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She observed that defendant had really improved and had worked hard in assisting counsel 
with his case (R. 175:16). Counsel acknowledged that defendant had an alcohol problem; 
she pleaded with the court to sentence defendant to a year in jail, noting that she had 
defendant screened and accepted to Odyssey House (R. 175:16). Having spoken to 
defendant's sister, counsel explained to the court a useful course of treatment - - that 
defendant receive a year of treatment comprised of a four to six months of inpatient 
treatment, followed by aftercare in which he would be reintroduced to the community (R. 
175:16-17). Counsel recited again how hard defendant had worked to make clear his 
responsibility, that he had been aware of the laboratory, but that he had not assembled it, 
although he had reaped in the proceeds (R. 175:17). She noted that defendant had cut ties 
with his drug associates and reallied with family members, who were both supportive and 
demanding of accountability (R. 175:17). Counsel again pleaded that defendant serve a year 
in jail, with the expectation that defendant, who was not a discipline problem, would succeed 
(R. 175:17-18). Finally, she asserted that from her conversations with defendant, he 
appeared to have only general knowledge of the methamphetamine cooking process (R. 
175:19). 
Judge Brian sentenced defendant to a five-to-life prison term in spite of the 
recommendation of AP&P in the PSI, which he read carefully (R. 152-53; 175:23-24). In 
support of its decision, Judge Brian made the following observations: (1) based on 
defendant's admission of "ownership" of the bedroom in which the clandestine laboratory 
was located and the proprietary sense that most people feel about their private space, "it 
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defie[d] reason and it defie[d] logic that the defendant was not only extremely mindful and 
aware of what was going on in the house, in his bedroom, but he acquiesced and participated 
[in it]" (R. 175:21); (2) umeth is a dirty, ugly, despicable, deplorable business . . . made [not] 
for individual consumption, [but] for distribution" (R. 175:21); (3)methamphetaminecooks 
know that there is high demand for and high profitability in the product (R. 175:21-22); (4) 
methamphetamine is extremely dangerous, risking the loss of property and contaminating the 
health of those in proximity, especially children who lack sufficient sophistication to defend 
themselves from it (R. 175:22); (5) the court would not accept that defendant was unaware 
of the operation (R. 175:23); (6) the court found the methamphetamine subculture 
"despicable" considering the danger of contamination presented to law enforcement in 
cleaning up methamphetamine laboratories up and to children who were exposed to it (R. 
175:23). The court concluded by stating: "And it is my hope that this morning, the word 
goes out, if you cook in this town and you come to my court you're going to prison" (R. 
175:24). 
Rule 23B proceedings 
After filing his notice of appeal, defendant, represented by new counsel, moved under 
rule 23B for a remand to the district court for findings of fact stemming from his claim that 
his counsel was ineffective at sentencing (R. 184). The motion asserted that Ms. Mendez had 
been ineffective in failing to sufficiently inform the sentencing court of the impact of 
defendant's early and tragic loss of his mother, the details of defendant's difficult life with 
his alcoholic and abusive father, and evidence of defendant's positive attributes and of 
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substantive family support (R. 201 -03,206-07). The motion was supported by Ms. Mendez's 
affidavit (R. 214-18). This Court granted the motion.3 
Judge Michael K. Burton presided over the rule 23B hearings, conducted over two 
days (R. 315-16). Ms. Mendez testified to the following pertinent facts: 
- she had extensive experience trying felony drug cases (R. 315:12); 
- she had a good understanding of this case and was prepared to go 
trial (R. 315:14); 
- she would generally prepare for sentencing in first degree felony cases 
by reviewing her file and comparing it to the PSI (which she would 
generally receive the day before sentencing), talking to family and 
employers, and going to the jail to review the PSI with her client 
(R. 315:15); 
- she considered herself to be "very proficient" in developing treatment 
plans to minimize the chances of her client's incarceration in 
third degree felony cases (R. 315:16); 
- she generally presumed that prison time would be imposed in a 
. st degree felony case (R. 315:16); 
- she did not follow her usual procedure in preparing for sentencing 
in this case because she knew defendant well, she knew 
defendant's sister and his father, defendant had a minimal 
record, the PSI did not recommend prison time even though 
3
 On remand, this Court directed the trial court to enter factual findings on four 
questions related to the assessment of defense counsel's effectiveness: 
(1) what efforts were undertaken by trial counsel in preparation for 
sentencing and what additional efforts could have been undertaken; (2) 
what were counsel's reasons for handling sentencing as counsel did; (3) 
what additional information relevant to sentencing could have been 
discovered by counsel relevant to sentencing; and (4) was the omission of 
the additional information prejudicial to Wright at sentencing. 
(R. 181). 
12 
it was written by an AP&P investigator who always 
recommends substantial incarceration, defendant had 
excellent family support, defendant had done well while out 
of custody and had not committed any crimes since the 
offense occurred (R. 315:16-17, 19); 
she presumed that she was in a better position than she was (R. 315:17); 
she received and reviewed the PSI the night before sentencing (R. 315:19); 
she met with defendant for fifteen minutes, read through the PSI with 
him, talked with defendant's sister, father and AP&P, which she 
asserted was different than her normal practice (R. 315:17, 19); 
because she was preoccupied with two high profile sex cases, which have 
much greater potential for incarceration than a drug conviction, and 
because defendant had demonstrated skills; she allowed herself to 
believe that defendant would not commit defendant (R. 315:17-18); 
defendant's family, which she came to know, were phenomenally supportive 
and would have done anything requested, including writing letters 
letters and asking defendant's employers to appear on defendant's 
behalf (R. 315:19-20); 
she would normally ask family members to provide letters to AP&P and the 
trial court because they "humanize" the client, exemplified by letters 
defendant's family purportedly sent to the Board of Pardons, but she 
did not in this case (R. 315:20-25);4 
she had discussed all the information in the letter of defendant's sister, 
Lisa Neilson (R. 315:22; Defendant's Ex. 1); 
she normally prepares an outline for sentencing, whereas in this case she 
only wrote notes on the PSI (R. 315:26-27); 
her goal at sentencing was to give Judge Brian her perspective on 
4
 The letters, defendant's exhibits 1-7, are presumably those attached to 
defendant's motion for rule 23B remand. (In fact, eight letters are attached to the 
motion.) Lacking sufficient authentication, they were admitted at the hearing only as 
examples of the type of letters Ms. Mendez would solicit for sentencing (R. 315:21-22, 
24-25). 
13 
defendant's minor role in the offense, based on her substantial 
research on the case, and to make clear that defendant had only 
a "nominal" criminal record and would be able to successfully 
complete probation (R. 315:27-28); 
- she felt she did a good job of communicating that defendant was a minor 
player, though she later wished that she had prepared a sentencing 
memorandum to more persuasively present the facts on this point; 
she also thought she did a "pretty effective job" of presenting 
defendant's minimal criminal history (R. 315:28-29); however, 
- she did not satisfy her goal, leaving out critical parts; she failed to present 
much evidence to the court to explain who defendant was as a 
person, the details of which she was already aware; to wit: defendant 
had raised himself and cared for his difficult, alcoholic father; 
defendant abused drugs as a coping mechanism probably because 
he had been abused; defendant was a good father and a responsible 
person in many ways with a good work ethic, willing to spend a year 
in jail and go to Odyssey House; defendant was willing to accept his 
family's the criticism about his drug use; and an intermittent period 
of sobriety, suggested he could do probation with his family's 
tremendous support; defendant struggled willingly to cooperate in 
his defense; defendant was kind and did not have an anger 
management problem; and defendant stayed involved in his family 
despite his drug addiction; defendant was an emotionally supportive 
person (R. 315:28-33); 
- she mistakenly presumed Judge Brian would sentence defendant to 
treatment in spite of defendant's conviction for operating a 
clandestine laboratory (R. 315:33-34); 
- given that the toughest of AP&P investigators had recommended 
probation, she believed that a better prepared argument would 
probably have achieved that result (R. 315:35); 
- she should have done more in this case and her preparation for sentencing 
was not the product of good trial strategy (R. 315:35). 
On cross-examination, the State elicited from Ms. Mendez that she wanted defendant 
to receive probation (R. 315:36). She observed that the AP&P investigator in this case, Mr. 
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Todd Orgill, typically wrote "a very good presentence report" with "a more prosecutorial 
bent" (R. 315:37). She noted that the PSI in this case was written in Mr. Orgill's typically 
''detailed and very concise, well-reasoned" style (R. 315:37). Because Mr. Orgill's favorable 
recommendation for probation independently confirmed her own perspective, it affected her 
decision to proceed at sentencing as she did (R. 315:37-38). 
Using 20/20 hindsight, Ms. Mendez believed that the comparatively greater 
seriousness of the child sex cases skewed her perspective on how much evidence needed to 
be presented to the sentencing court (R. 315:39-40). She could not unequivocably say that 
her perspective was an unreasonable assessment at the time (R. 315:40). Even though Judge 
Brian strongly expressed his negative views of methamphetamine cooks, Ms. Mendez 
believed that she could have affected the outcome at sentencing if she had presented 
information in the letters of family members to the court (R. 315:42). 
On redirect examination, Ms. Mendez asserted that she could have minimized 
defendant's involvement in the offense if she had presented an affidavit from defendant's 
father and recounted the illegal drug activity in the house before and after defendant lived 
there (R. 315:45). She also failed to obtain an affidavit from defendant's girlfriend, Susie, 
asserting that defendant had asked her not to come to premises with the children because of 
the danger of methamphetamine laboratories (R. 315:46-47). 
Ms. Mendez fiirther believed that probation was likely because of favorable small talk 
with the prosecutor at the motion to suppress hearing (R. 315:48). She did not do everything 
she could have done (R. 315:48). 
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On the second day of the hearing, Judge Brian testified as follows: 
- he was familiar with the case from having presided at the sentencing and 
receiving the PSI and the transcript of the sentencing hearing (State's 
Ex. land 2), and other documents (R. 316:4-5);:) 
- Ms. Mendez had appeared in his courtroom "many, many, many, many 
times; he thought she was a "very conscientious, skilled defense 
attorney" (R. 316:6); 
- he thought she was "extremely effective" at the sentencing hearing, to 
wit: she has a "credible approach" which inspires confidence that 
the court can rely on her representations, she is a "very aggressive 
advocate in a pleasant way," she did "a very, very good job 
in representing the defendant," and he did not think she could 
have done anything differently or better (R. 316:6-7); 
- he carefully read the PSI two or three times before sentencing defendant 
(R. 316:10); 
- he sentenced defendant to a five-to-life term because "he deserved it," 
to wit: "defendant was an active participant cooking methamphetamine 
with children in the home in a neighborhood where people live close 
by and he put the stuff in circulation for people to buy and ruin 
their lives with" (R. 316:7); 
- he remembered that the children were traumatized by the presence of 
police officers, that the clandestine laboratory was found in defendant's 
bedroom, and that defendant was a participant "in what was going on" 
"he was in it up to his armpits" (R. 316:8); 
- the extent of methamphetamine and precursor chemicals had a significant 
bearing on the court's sentencing defendant to the penitentiary 
(R. 316:9); 
- if Ms. Mendez had informed him that, 
(1) defendant's mother was killed in a car accident and that he 
5
 Prior to the hearing, the State sent Judge Brian a copy of defendant's rule 23B 
memorandum, which also included copies of Ms. Mendez's affidavit and letters from 
defendant's family to the Board of Pardons (R. 197, 197A, 201-272C). 
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watched his mother bleed to death; 
(2) defendant was raised by his alcoholic father who assertedly 
left him and his sister alone at night to drink and then beat them 
for calling him at the bar to ask that he come home; 
(3) defendant was a good father, that he was hard working, reliable, 
trustworthy and caring; 
(4) defendant had strong family support; 
(5) defendant's sister would support his rehabilitation, drug 
treatment and counseling by allowing him to live with her, 
it would not have resulted in a different sentence (R. 316:9-11); 
- nothing in any of the documents presented to him or anything he had 
heard about the case would have resulted in a different sentence 
(R. 316:9-11); 
- defendant may have deserved more than a five-to-life sentence (R. 316:34). 
On cross-examination, Judge Brian testified that, 
- he thought that defendant's willingness to freely care for his needy 
father, to forgive someone who had molested him, to refrain 
from stealing to support his drug habit, and that virtually 
everyone defendant interacted with thought him to be a 
warmhearted, caring, giving person, spoke well of defendant's 
character (R. 316:20, 22-25); 
- if he had been informed that, 
(1) defendant blamed himself for his mother's death, which was 
probably a traumatic event many years prior to his cooking 
methamphetamine; 
(2) defendant would not leave the house for a year after his mother's 
death, which occurred when he was three, and later self-medicated 
with methamphetamine; 
(3) defendant was sexually molested, but forgave his attacker; 
(4) defendant chose to care for his alcoholic, abusive father even 
though he was free to leave the home; 
(5) defendant repeatedly and vehemently urged the children's mother 
to keep them away from the premises, 
it would not have resulted in a different sentence (R. 316:17-22, 25-28); 
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- his statement at sentencing, that "every cook goes to prison," was 
overbroad, but it was appropriate in this case (R. 316:31); 
- he thought Ms. Mendez performed well, as she typically did, and was 
"very hard on herself in asserting that her performance was below 
her normal standard (R. 316:37-38); 
- he was "absolutely confident in [his] decision in this case" (R. 316:37). 
Lisa Neilson, testifying for defendant, her brother, confirmed statements earlier made 
by Ms. Mendez about information Ms. Mendez believed she did not fully present to the court 
(R. 316:39-4).6 
The court subsequently issued findings of fact responsive to the questions posed by 
this Court's remand order, referenced in the argument portion of this brief (Findings on 
Remand, R. 304-13, attached at Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced as the result of any failure of his 
trial counsel to present to the sentencing court's evidence of a challenging family background 
or of his minimal involvement in the offense. Authority on which defendant relies is 
substantially distinguishable from the facts of this case. Particularly, the additional family 
background evidence adduced during the rule 23B proceeding was insufficiently voluminous 
6
 Specifically, Ms. Neilson testified that she was available to provide any 
assistance needed, including letters of reference, that defendant blamed himself for his 
mother's death, which traumatized him, that he was sexually abused and later forgave his 
abuser, that life with their drunken, abusive father was "a living hell," that defendant 
cared for his father devotedly, that defendant was genuinely concerned for people, that he 
would never take anything, but rather insist on returning a service for the item requested, 
and that defendant repeatedly told his girlfriend not to bring her children to the house (R. 
316:39-47). Ms. Neilson's understanding that defendant was abused was based only on 
his account (R. 316:51-53). 
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or distinctly persuasive to support any reasonable probability that there would have been a 
different outcome if the court had heard it at the sentencing. Similarly, defendant was not 
prejudiced because his counsel brought to the sentencing court's attention at least as much 
mitigating information concerning his involvement in the offense as defendant was able to 
adduce at the rule 23B hearing. Additionally, defendant's claim that he was denied due 
process lacks record substance, since it primarily relies on the sentencing judge's testimony 
about his mental processes, inadmissible in this Court's determination of prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AT SENTENCING WHERE THE UNDISCLOSED 
INFORMATION WAS UNREMARKABLE IN LIGHT OF 
DEFENDANT'S GUILT FOR A SERIOUS OFFENSE 
Defendant claims his trial counsel performed deficiently at sentencing in failing to 
adequately prepare for the hearing, to present mitigating evidence of his life history, and to 
correct the trial court's misperception of his involvement in the offense. Aplt. Br. at 21-22, 
30-36. Defendant compares this case to two capital punishment cases involving egregious 
failures of attorney preparation and judgment. Aplt. Br. at 25-30, 36-42. Because 
defendant's claim so clearly fails to establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
performance, the State's response is limited to that discussion. Particularly, trial counsel 
substantially discussed at sentencing evidence claimed to have been prejudicially omitted and 
whose weight, in any event, was undermined by other undisputed facts in the PSI. 
Additionally, defendant's claim that he was denied due process lacks record substance, since 
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it primarily relies on the sentencing judge's testimony about his mental processes, 
inadmissible in this Court's determination of prejudice. 
A. The standard of review. 
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [a defendant] must show 
that (1) trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) there exists a reasonable 
probability that absent the deficient conduct, the outcome would likely have been more 
favorable to [defendant]." State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, f 21, 9 P.3d 777 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693 (1984)). However, "a court need not 
determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice 
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
"If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice, . . . that course should be followed." State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). The unique facts of this case 
demonstrate that there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome at the sentencing 
absent defendant's trial counsel's alleged deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 697 ("[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to . . . 
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on 
one.") Therefore, without conceding the first Strickland prong, the State declines to address 
whether counsel performed deficiently. Defendant must establish the prejudice prong by 
affirmatively "show[ing] that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective 
counsel, the result would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 
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sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 
(Utah 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "This requires showing that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "In making this determination, an appellate court 
should consider 'the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the 
errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the 
verdict is supported by the record.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 187 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 696). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,397-98 (2000) (observing that in making the 
prejudice determination, the reviewing court should take into account the totality of the 
mitigation evidence adduced at both the penalty phase and in the post trial proceeding in 
reweighing it against the aggravating evidence). "The benchmark forjudging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of 
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
B. Defendant has failed to show prejudice because additional evidence 
introduced at the rule 23B hearing was insufficiently voluminous or 
distinctly persuasive beyond that which was introduced at sentencing. 
/• Defendant's authorities, discussing dramatic failures to present 
personal background information, are inapposite to this case 
In support of his claim, defendant compares Ms. Mendez's performance to counsel 
in Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003) and Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430 (11th 
Cir. 1987). Aplt. Br. at 24-31,37-38. Both cases are substantial distinguishable in the extent 
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to which the defendants were prejudiced by their counsel's substantially deficient 
performances beyond anything demonstrated by Ms. Mendez in this case. 
In Wiggins, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and theft in the 
slaying of a 77-year-old woman found drowned in her bathtub. Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2531-
32. In advance of the penalty phase, Wiggins' two trial counsel had a psychological report, 
a PSI, and records from the Baltimore Department of Social Services (DSS). Id. at 2536. 
The psychological report, arranged for by counsel, concluded that Wiggins had an I.Q. of 79 
and exhibited certain coping difficulties and a personality disorder, but detailed nothing of 
his life history. Id. The PSI contained a one-page "personal history," noting Wiggins' 
"misery as a youth," which he reported as "disgusting," and observing that Wiggins had 
spent most of his life in foster care. Id. The DSS records documented Wiggins foster care 
placements and revealed that his mother was a chronic alcoholic, that Wiggins was shuttled 
from one foster home to another, that he had frequent truancies from school and that on at 
least one occasion Wiggins' mother had left him alone for days without food. Id. at 2536-37. 
Limiting their investigation to this information, and after the trial court denied a motion to 
bifurcate the penalty proceeding, counsel elected to argue to the jury that Wiggins should be 
spared the death penalty because the evidence did not prove that he was the actual killer, as 
required under Maryland law. Id. at 2532, 2541. Having heard virtually no mitigating 
evidence, the jury returned with a sentence of death. Id. at 2532. 
The United States Supreme Court held that Wiggins' counsel performance fell below 
prevailing standards in capital sentencing cases by failing to further investigate their client's 
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life and family history in light of what they already knew. Id. at 2535-39 ('in light of what 
the PSI and the DSS records actually revealed, however, counsel chose to abandon their 
investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with respect to 
sentencing strategy impossible.") Had counsel conducted the investigation clearly suggested 
by the reports, counsel would have uncovered the following significant information that 
subsequently came to light in federal postconviction proceedings: (1) Wiggins' mother's 
absence from the home compelled Wiggins and his siblings to beg for food and to eat paint 
chips and garbage for days on end; (2) Mrs. Wiggins' child abuse included beatings for 
breaking into the kitchen, which she often kept locked; (3) Mrs. Wiggins had sex with men 
while her children slept in the same bed; (4) on one occasion, Mrs. Wiggins forcibly pressed 
Wiggins' hand against a hot stove burner, an event resulting in his hospitalization; (5) 
Wiggins was first placed in foster care when he was six years old; (6) Wiggins' first and 
second foster mothers physically abused him; (7) the father in one of Wiggins' foster homes 
repeatedly molested and raped him; (8) when sixteen years old, Wiggins fled his foster home 
and started living on the streets; (9) when he returned to one of his foster homes, Wiggins 
was allegedly gang-raped on more than one occasion by the foster mother's sons; (10) after 
leaving the foster care system and entering a Job Corps program, Wiggins was allegedly 
sexually abused by his supervisor. Id. at 2533. Based on counsels' failure to present the jury 
with this "powerful" mitigating evidence, and particularly in light of Wiggins' having no 
prior record of violent conduct, the Court concluded that defendant was prejudiced because 
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"there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different 
balance." Id. at 2542-44. 
Armstrong presents a similar scenario. Armstrong was convicted of two counts of 
first degree murder. Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1430 (11th Cir. 1987). Defense 
counsel made no objection to immediately proceeding to the penalty phase, speaking briefly 
only to Armstrong's mother and stepfather and presenting testimony of only Armstrong's 
parole officer. Id. at 1432. The Eleventh Circuit found defense counsel, inexperienced in 
the capital sentencing procedure, ineffective in failing to develop a mitigation case through 
a number of witnesses who were available to testify. Id. Specifically, Armstrong's family 
members could have testified that he was raised in poverty and poor living conditions 
without adult supervision, that he worked as a fruit picker to supplement his grandmother's 
income which resulted in irregular school attendance, that he was a hard worker, nonviolent, 
and religious, that he had epileptic seizures, and that he was mentally retarded and had 
organic brain damage. Id. at 1433-34. The court concluded that counsel's failure to uncover 
such mitigating evidence was clearly prejudicial. Id. at 1434. 
Here, the quantum of reliable, unimpeachable, significantly mitigating evidence 
actually adduced at the rule 23B hearing, beyond that which Ms. Mendez presented at the 
sentencing, falls far short of either Wiggins or Armstrong. At sentencing, Ms. Mendez 
argued that defendant had cleared his head of drugs for the first time in four years, that had 
consistently worked and paid as much as fifty percent of his income in child support despite 
his drug problem (R. 175:14). She had spoken with family members who asserted that 
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defendant had remained an "emotional father for his children," who was failing financially 
only "towards the end" (R. 175:14-15). She pointed to three rows of defendant's supportive 
family and friends (R. 175:16). She stated to the court that defendant had had a "hard time 
of it," referring to the death of his mother and a father addicted to methamphetamine (R. 
175:16). She also indicated to the court that defendant had severed ties with his drug cronies 
and reconnected with his family, which was supportive and demanded his accountability (R. 
175:17). Further, the PSI, which the trial court had ordered and read carefully, noted that 
defendant's mother had died when he was five years old and that following her death he lived 
with his "stern" alcoholic father, a childhood he described as "rough" (R. 175:23-24; 176:8; 
R:173:7). 
At the rule 23B hearing, Ms. Mendez testified, and the Judge Burton found, that she 
deviated from her normal practice in a number of particulars. Aple. Br. at 13-16; Findings 
on Remand, R. 304-13, at 305-7, attached at Addendum B). However, although Ms. Mendez 
did not prepare for sentencing in her normal fashion, the trial court found that the only 
additional relevant information Ms. Mendez could have discovered consisted of letters 
typical of those represented by defendant's exhibits 1-7, the details surrounding the death of 
defendant's mother, the fact defendant had been sexually abused as a child and its effect on 
him, and the details of the abuse defendant suffered from his father (R. 310-11). The letters 
were not admitted for the truth of their contents, and Judge Burton made no findings 
concerning the effect of the death of defendant's mother or of the alleged abuse of a sexual 
molester or defendant's father (R. 315:21-22, 24-25). 
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Even assuming that this court admitted the letters for their substantive value, only the 
following information would have emerged: defendant was a loving, intelligent father whose 
children were suffering from his absence (ex-wife, aunt, aunt by marriage, R. 222-23, 228-
30, 234); defendant was a trustworthy, dependable worker who would not steal from his 
employer who would still offer him a job (sister, former employer, R. 220,224); if defendant 
would make the choice, defendant's uncle could offer assistance as member of Alcoholics 
Anonymous (uncle, R. 226-27); defendant had fallen in with the wrong people (aunt, 
grandparents, cousin, R. 230,231,232-33); and the loss of defendant's mother was traumatic 
and life with father was physically and emotionally abusive (grandparents and cousin, R. 
231,232-33). Additionally, she could have presented to the sentencing court the substance 
of the testimony of Ms. Neilson, defendant's sister: defendant withdrew after witnessing his 
mother bleed to death in an automobile wreck for which he blamed himself (R. 316:42-43); 
after the accident, defendant and Ms. Neilson were raised by their alcoholic, absentee father, 
which was a 'living hell" because they were frequently alone, scared of his anger, and 
without enough food (R. 316:44-45); in spite of his difficult upbringing with his father, 
defendant was forgiving with his father and later cared for him (R. 316:45-46); and defendant 
was sexually abused by a family member, but after forgiving his assailant he seemed to be 
"fine"(R. 316:44). 
Based on Judge Burton's findings, which do not find as fact any of the alleged 
specifics of defendant's assertedly difficult childhood, defendant's circumstances are 
dramatically different from those portrayed in Wiggins and Armstrong, See Wiggins, 123 S. 
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Ct. at 2533 (defendant, with I.Q. of 79, severely physically abused and deprived by absentee 
mother and repeatedly sexually abused over a period of years by numerous different 
individuals in foster homes, and evidently without any family support and no prior violent 
conduct); Armstrong, 833 F.2d at 1433-34 (defendant with history of nonviolence and 
religious activities, epileptic and mentally retarded and organically brain damaged). 
Further, even if information supplied by defendant's family members had been 
recognized for its substantive content, its veracity was substantially challenged by the PSI 
and evidence adduced on cross-examination at the rule 23B hearing. Family members and 
a former employer asserted that defendant was a trustworthy, dependable employee, but 
defendant's juvenile record showed charges for burglary of a vehicle, three charges offish 
and game violations, and a shoplifting, and his adult record showed a conviction for a retail 
theft (R. 220,224; R: 173:5-6). Defendant was alleged to be a dependable, loving father, but 
he was $5,000 in arrears in his support obligation, evidencing a failure to pay for a total 
period of more than one and one-half years (R. 222-23, 228-30, 234; R:173:7, 10). There 
was no confirmation that defendant had actually witnessed his mother's bleeding to death (R. 
316:50). Other than defendant's claims, there was no confirmation that defendant had 
actually been sexually abused. No report was made to the police, and defendant denied to 
the AP&P investigator that he had ever been physically or sexually abused (R. 316:50,52-53; 
R: 173:8). Finally, the trial court could reasonably have inferred that defendant was not 
psychologically disposed to profit from treatment, in spite of evident family support. Unlike 
Wiggins and Armstrong, who displayed no prior conduct even remotely related to the 
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murders they committed, defendant had a long-standing history of substance abuse resulting 
in multiple criminal charges and a separate conviction (R: 173:5-6, 9). The trial court might 
also have regarded defendant's and his family's failure to secure treatment for him following 
the alleged traumas of his early years not to be a mitigating factor (R. 316:44). Rather, such 
failure could be seen as defendant's refusal to acknowledge and deal with his purported 
difficulties and his family's inability to effectively counsel him. Defendant's failure to 
complete high school, reportedly only 1/4 credit short of the requirement for a diploma, is 
further evidence of his actual inability to act accountably (R: 173:8). 
The limited difference between the evidence presented to the trial court at sentencing 
and that which was potentially available compares more closely with the facts of Lovitt v. 
Warden, 585 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 2003), than with those of Wiggins or Armstrong. In Lovitt, 
defendant claimed his counsel performed ineffectively in failing to investigate and present 
mitigating evidence of his family background. Id. at 822. Distinguishing Wiggins, the court 
noted that at the penalty phase defense counsel presented some favorable recent personal 
history and "some" family history evidence through Lovitt's stepsister. Id. at 823. The 
stepsister testified that Lovitt helped his younger siblings in various aspects of their 
upbringing in place of their absentee, alcoholic stepfather. Id. 
At the hearing on Lovitt's petition for writ of habeas corpus, evidence of Lovitt's 
family and social history came from three family members and records of various state 
agencies and the courts. Id. at 823. The court characterized the testimony of family 
members as "mostly general statements" concerning his stepfather's abuse. Id. at 824. Each 
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of the three family members testified in much the same terms that the absentee, alcoholic 
stepfather was 'Very abusive," regularly beat and cursed at Lovitt and was mean to him and 
molested all the children. Id. In spite of such treatment, they asserted, Lovitt was very 
protective and helpful with his siblings and children, who regarded him as a father figure. 
Id. The court noted that the various records were equivocal in some respects and could have 
been viewed by the jury as either aggravating or mitigating. Id. For example, the medical 
records showed that Lovitt had been a multiple substance abuser from an early age into 
adulthood. Id. The court noted that this evidence, along with Lovitt's extensive criminal 
record, was "double-edged." Id. at 825. The court also observed that because there was no 
evidence in the record from a mental health professional, there was no way to assess the 
effect of Lovitt's family life on his development, and consequently, the prejudice Lovitt 
might have suffered. Id. Additionally, there was no evidence of diminished mental capacity, 
as exhibited by the defendant in Wiggins; rather, Lovitt had obtained a high school 
equivalency diploma. Id. at 826. Based on the modest difference between the evidence 
offered at the penalty phase and that offered at the habeas hearing, and considering the 
double-edged nature of the reports, the court concluded that Lovitt had not been prejudiced 
by his counsel's failure to present available mitigation evidence. Id. at 825-26 (noting that 
the absence of mitigation evidence did not raise concerns that might affect the jury's 
appraisal of the defendant's moral culpability). See also Johnson v. Bell, 344 F.3d 567,569-
70, 574 (6th Cir. 2003) (declining to find prejudice and distinguishing Wiggins, in spite of 
additional testimony from family members and friends that the defendant was a hard worker, 
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a good family man and employee, and beloved by his family, all which would admittedly 
have helped "humanize" the defendant). 
In light of the foregoing authority better reflecting the circumstances of this case, the 
additional family background evidence adduced during the rule 23B proceeding was 
insufficiently voluminous or distinctly persuasive to support any reasonable probability that 
there would have been a different outcome if the sentencing court had heard it. 
2. Defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced by the 
trial court's understanding of his involvement in the 
offense and the presence of children at his residence. 
Defendant also argues that in addition to her failure to introduce mitigating family 
background information, Ms. Mendez was ineffective in failing to correct the trial court's 
inaccurate understanding of defendant's involvement in the offense. Aplt. Br. at 22, 35-36. 
Specifically, defendant argues that Ms. Mendez failed to adequately inform the court that 
defendant was not himself either cooking or distributing methamphetamine. Aplt. Br. at 36. 
In support, defendant asserts that Ms. Mendez merely informed the court at sentencing that 
defendant had "a lack of knowledge as to the cooking process." Aplt. Br. at 36. The 
argument is unsupported by the record. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, Ms. Mendez repeatedly argued to the court that 
defendant was only minimally involved in the offense: defendant, with the assistance of his 
father, had actually been moving out of the house and had not stayed there the night the 
warrant was executed (R. 175:13); defendant's role in the clandestine laboratory was minor, 
in contradistinction to Josh Corbett's activity in selling the drugs (R. 175:12); Orville Dorius, 
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defendant's next door neighbor, who was subject to federal charges in connection with his 
drug activity, was operating the clandestine laboratory behind the locked door to defendant's 
bedroom, not defendant (R. 175:14). She placed her credibility directly on the line when she 
asserted, in direct response to the court's skeptical inquiry, that she personally believed that 
defendant had only provided a place to cook drugs (R. 175:12). 
At the rule 23B hearing, Judge Burton found that Ms. Mendez could have prepared 
a sentencing memorandum detailing defendant's role in the offense (R. 306). However, 
Judge Burton also confirmed that Ms. Mendez believed she had done a "good job" and was 
"pretty effective" in explaining that defendant was a minor player in the drug manufacturing 
operation (R. 315:28-29; 308). Defendant failed to develop any evidence regarding this 
alleged deficiency. 
Ms. Mendez's substantial argument at sentencing, contrary to defendant's assertion, 
makes plain that she did not perform deficiently in attempting to show that defendant was 
only a minor player in the clandestine laboratory. Consequently, he was not prejudiced. As 
to Ms. Mendez alleged failure to clarify to the court that defendant was not selling drugs to 
others, defendant's argument misses the point. Judge Brian never expressed the view that 
defendant himself was the actual methamphetamine cook or that he was personally selling 
drugs. Rather, the judge was persuaded, based on his experience, that drug laboratories 
operate to distribute drugs (R. 175:21-22; 316:26). Since defendant had pleaded guilty to 
the offense by "allowing [the clandestine laboratory] to occur in my residence," defendant 
was necessarily responsible for allowing an indisputably dangerous product to be 
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disseminated to the public even if he was not a direct participant. Additionally, the trial court 
might reasonably have distrusted anything defendant had to say about his involvement, since 
he implied at sentencing that he had no knowledge of the laboratory in his bedroom, even 
though he had pleaded guilty to the offense (R. 175:19). Thus, persuading Judge Brian that 
defendant was neither a methamphetamine cook nor an actual distributor was immaterial to 
the judge's sentencing decision, and any failure of trial counsel to convince Judge Brian 
otherwise could not have been prejudicial. 
Defendant also argues that Ms. Mendez failed to disabuse the court of its view that 
defendant knew that children were in the residence where the drug was manufactured. Aplt. 
Br. at 36. In fact, Ms. Mendez argued at sentencing that photographs showing the children 
on the premises were prejudicial, implying they suggested that defendant knew the children 
were in the house, when his girlfriend had brought them into the house unbeknownst to him 
(R. 175:13-14). At the rule 23B hearing, Mendez asserted that she could have provided 
affidavits stating that defendant had told Susie, his girlfriend and the children's mother, not 
to bring the children to the house (R. 315:46). Additionally, Ms. Neilson testified that it 
surprised her that the children were at the house when the police arrived because defendant's 
girlfriend had been told many times not to bring the children around (R. 316:47). 
Notwithstanding this additional testimony, Judge Burton made no finding to the effect that 
Ms. Mendez performed deficiently or that defendant was prejudiced. 
Even assuming that the additional testimony introduced at the rule 23B hearing more 
clearly conveyed the notion already conveyed by Ms. Mendez at the sentencing, that 
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defendant had told his girlfriend not to bring the children to the residence, the deficiency was 
not prejudicial. As with the claims that the trial court was misinformed about defendant's 
participation in the offense, defendant also mistakenly asserts that Judge Brian was 
concerned with whether defendant actually knew that the children were on the premises. 
Rather, it is clear from his remarks at sentencing and at the rule 23B hearing, that a 
methamphetamine operation is so inherently dangerous to both those involved in the process 
and the surrounding community, that defendant's merely conducting the operation where 
there was any possibility of children being present justified the sentence (R. 175:22; 316:7). 
In fact, defendant's acknowledgment at the time of arrest, that his room and the garage 
contained "very hazardous" materials and "bad stuff," and the children's unplanned presence 
at defendant's residence, only confirm Judge Brian's view of the matter. Thus, as with 
defendant's other claims, persuading Judge Brian that defendant was unaware of the 
children's presence was immaterial to the judge's sentencing decision, and any failure of trial 
counsel to convince Judge Brian otherwise could not have been prejudicial. 
C. Testimony of the trial judge at the rule 23B hearing is irrelevant 
to determining whether defendant suffered prejudice as a result 
of his counsel's alleged deficiencies. 
Defendant argues if Ms. Mendez had informed the trial court of his troubled life 
history, his positive family support, and his limited involvement in the clandestine lab, the 
sentencing outcome would have been different. Aplt. Br. at 37-39. The foregoing discussion 
refutes that contention. However, defendant further suggests that he was denied due process 
based on Judge Brian's disposition toward this case and Judge Brian's sentencing 
33 
predilections in clandestine laboratory cases. Specifically, defendant argues that Judge 
Brian's emphatic assertions that notice of such mitigating evidence would not have affected 
his sentencing decision, and particularly Judge Brian's remark at sentencing, that "if you 
cook in this town and you come to my court you're going to prison," evidenced an unduly 
"inflexible" attitude. Aplt. Br. at 40-42 (citing R: 175:24). In support, defendant cites 
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) and United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th 
Cir. 1971). Aplt. Br. at 41-42. To the extent defendant's argument relies on Judge Brian's 
testimony at the rule 23B hearing, the argument is irrelevant. 
In Strickland, the state trial judge gave testimony in the federal habeas proceeding, 
on which the district court partly relied in concluding the defendant had not been prejudiced 
by any failure of his trial counsel. 466 U.S. at 679. In setting out the prejudice analysis in 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court noted that the defendant had no right to 
a "lawless" decisionmaker. Id. at 695. Rather, "[t]he assessment of prejudice should proceed 
on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially 
applying the standards that govern the decision [and] [i]t should not depend on the 
idiosyncracies of the particular decisionmaker, such as unusual propensities toward harshness 
or leniency." Id. "Thus," the Court stated, "evidence about the actual process of decision, 
if not part of the record of the proceeding under review, and evidence about, for example, a 
particular judge's sentencing practices, should not be considered in the prejudice 
determination." Id. Consequently, the Court found that testimony given by the trial 
"irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry." 466 U.S. at 700. See also Morrison v. Kimmelman, 650 
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F. Supp. 801, 805-07 (D. N.J. 1986) (denying admission on policy grounds and federal rules 
of trial court's testimony sought to show whether uninvestigated evidence would have 
affected bench trial weighing of evidence resulting in conviction). Therefore, to the extent 
that defendant has marshaled Judge Brian's rule 23B hearing testimony to suggest that he 
inflexibly sentenced defendant based on his personal sentencing priorities, that testimony is 
irrelevant. 
Even if defendant were to consider defendant's due process claim based on Judge 
Brians's testimony, it would refute defendant's claim. First, a due process challenge adds 
nothing analytically to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 697 ("An ineffectiveness claim, however, as our articulation of the standards that govern 
decision of such claims makes clear, is an attack on the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding whose result is challenged.") Additionally, neither of defendant's authorities is 
apposite to this case. In Williams, the issue was whether due process precluded the court 
from relying on as complete a life history that the probation department could assemble for 
sentencing purposes without affording the defendant an opportunity to confront the report's 
sources. 337 U.S. at 251-52. In Daniels, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case of a young 
conscientious objector who was willing to accept judicially ordered alternative service to the 
district court, which in more than thirty years had never deviated from imposing the 
maximum sentence on a selective service violator. 446 F.2d at 971-72. 
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Even considering Judge Brian's isolated comment, it does not suggest by itself an 
intransigent attitude to methamphetamine cooks ind does not properly characterize the 
individuated, considered approach Judge Brian took in sentencing this defendant. 
Judge Brian testified that in preparation for the sentencing he "carefully" read the PSI 
two or three times (R. 316:10). See Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines (2003) Appendix 
D at 1472-74 (strongly urging trial court to employ PSI in reaching sentencing decision). He 
was solicitous at the outset of sentencing in readily making corrections to the PSI identified 
by Ms. Mendez (R. 175:3-4). As noted above, Judge Brian identified the factors that led to 
his sentencing decision, all of which were supported by the evidence at the preliminary 
hearing and the PSI (R. 316:7-11,26). He explained that any possible trauma stemming from 
the death of defendant's mother would not have affected his decision because it was remote 
from the instant offense (R. 316:18-19). He similarly explained that while possible trauma 
stemming from being sexually molested might have affected defendant's outlook, it would 
not likely have affected defendant's judgment about whether it was unlawful to cook 
methamphetamine (R. 316:19). Judge Brian asserted that he considered defendant's 
character in sentencing him (R. 316:22). He acknowledged that defendant's willingness to 
freely care for his needy father, to forgive someone who had molested him, to refrain from 
stealing to support his drug habit, and that virtually everyone defendant interacted with 
thought him to be a warmhearted, caring, giving person, spoke well of defendant's character 
(R. 316:20,22-25). 
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Judge Brian also repeatedly qualified his statement implying that he indiscriminately 
sentenced all methamphetamine cooks to prison. He acknowledged that his statement was 
"probably a little bit overbroad" (R. 316:31). He asserted first that "[m]aybe not every cook 
goes to prison," and expressed the same sentiment twice more, stating that "of course," he 
did not sentence every cook to prison," and "certainly they don't all go to prison" (R. 
316:31, 35-36). He acknowledged that he was probably "a little bit upset" with defendant 
when he made the statement because he believed defendant was "right in the thick" of 
preparing a substance dangerous to his own family, friends and neighbors (R. 316:33-34). 
In sum, defendant can in nowise show that he was prejudiced by Judge Brian's 
consideration of the circumstances of his case for the purpose of sentencing.7 
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 The State candidly acknowledges that, like defendant, it too is precluded under 
Strickland from relying on Judge Brian's testimony to support its argument that defendant 
was not prejudiced, even though this Court has recognized its interest in such testimony. 
Writing with respect to an inquiry the chairman of a 1996 Utah Supreme Court committee 
considering possible amendments to rule 23B, Judge Orme, writing for the entire Utah 
Court of Appeals, stated that "at least in those cases where the judge dealing with the 
matter on remand is the judge who presided over the original trial, his or her insight on 
whether any deficient performance actually resulted in prejudice could be extremely 
helpful to the appellate court." See January 8, 1996 letter of Judge Gregory K. Orme, 
then presiding judge, attached at Addendum C. 
If the Court were to consider Judge Brian's views, they would substantially 
support the State's argument that defendant was not prejudiced as a result of his counsel's 
alleged deficiencies. 
Judge Brian was unequivocal in stating that he sentenced to a five-to-life term 
because he was convinced that defendant was "up to his armpits" in manufacturing drugs 
and that the background information defendant claims should have been emphasized 
would have made no difference (R: 316:8-11, 17-22, 25-28). Asked why he sentenced 
defendant as he did, Judge Brian the stated: "Because he deserved it. . . . [H]e was an 
active participant cooking methamphetamine with children in the home in a neighborhood 
where people lived close by and he put the stuff in circulation for people to buy and ruin 
their lives with" (R. 316:7). 
Judge Brian testified that the following facts persuaded him that defendant 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the trial court's sentencing decision should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this > ^ day of November, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
deserved severe punishment: (1) defendant essentially acknowledged his guilt by stating 
to children at his home during the police raid that the police where there because of what 
he had been doing (R. 316:8); photos of the inside of the home showing the clandestine 
lab was in defendant's bedroom (R. 316:8); defendant directed police to contaminated 
materials in the garage of the home (R. 316:8); and the substantial amount of 
methamphetamine and precursor chemicals confiscated (R. 316: 9). 
As for the background and character information defendant claims should have 
been offered at his sentencing hearing, Judge Brian said that none it would have made a 
difference in how defendant was sentenced. Specifically, Judge Brian stated that 
defendant's having blamed himself for an accident in which he watched his mother bleed 
to death and that he had an alcoholic, abusive father were experiences that happened 
nearly 30 years earlier, which could not excuse the serious criminal activity in which 
defendant was involved (R. 316:10, 17-18). Similarly, the testimonials of family and 
friends that defendant was a good father, hard-working, reliable, trustworthy and caring, 
in spite of his background and sexual molestation would have been equally unavailing in 
view of the seriousness of the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine (R. 316:11, 19-
20). Judge Brian also stated that even if he had heard that defendant repeatedly and 
vehemently urged his girlfriend to keep the children from his residence that also would 
not have effected his decision (R. 316:27-28). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE CF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT ALLEN WRIGHT, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS ON REMAND 
Case No. 001912104 
Hon. MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
December 3, 2002 
On or about May 15, 2002, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded 
the above-entitled matter back to the trial court for the purpose 
of entry of findings of fact on the following factual issues: 
(la) what efforts were undertaken by trial counsel in 
preparation for sentencing; (lb) what additional efforts could 
have been undertaken; (2) what were counsel's reasons for 
handling sentencing as counsel did; (3) what additional 
information relevant to sentencing could have been discovered by 
counsel prior to sentencing; and (4) was the omission of the 
additional information prejudicial to Wright at sentencing. 
The Court held evidentiary hearings relevant to the Court of 
Appeals Order of Remand on July 12, 2002 and August 23, 2002. 
Closing arguments were heard on October 16, 2002, at which time 
the parties also presented the Court with their proposed findings 
of fact. Having considered the evidence offered by the parties 
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and having listened to and reviewed the argument of counsel, the 
Court rakes the following findings of fact: 
la. What efforts were undertaken by trial counsel in 
preparation for sentencing? 
The Court finds the following: 
a. Counsel received the presentence report the night 
before the sentencing hearing and reviewed it. 
b. Counsel met with Mr. Wright for approximately 15 
minutes and read through the presentence report 
with him. 
c. Counsel talked briefly with Mr. Wright's sister. 
d. Counsel made notes on her copy of the presentence 
report for her argument. 
lb. The Court finds that counsel could have undertaken the 
following additional efforts in preparation for 
sentencing: 
a. Presume prison was the most likely outcome and 
prepare her presentation from that perspective; 
b. Review the presentence report in more careful 
detail as was counsel's typical practice; 
c. Compare the facts contained in the PSR with the 
facts counsel had documented in her file during 
the course of the defense, which was counsel's 
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typical practice; 
d. Contact the defendant's previous employers, which 
was counsel's typical practice; 
e. Interview the defendant's family for the specific 
purpose of preparing for sentencing, which was 
counsel's typical practice; 
f. Meet with and interview the defendant's children 
and the mother of his children, which was 
counsel's typical practice; 
g. Visit with the defendant in person and review the 
presentence report in careful detail, which is 
counsel's typical practice; 
h. Collect and offer to the Court, counsel and AP&P, 
letters of recommendation from the defendant's 
family, friends and employers, which was counsel's 
typical practice; 
i. Prepare an outline for argument in order to assure 
there was a cohesive framework in which to present 
the argument at sentencing; 
j. Prepare and offer to the Court a sentencing 
memorandum concerning the defendant's history, the 
facts of the case, the defendant's role in the 
offense, and a comprehensive and detailed analysis 
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concerning why AP&P's recommendation was 
appropriate. 
k. Ms. Kreek-Mendez stated that she did not believe 
she properly represented defendant at the 
sentencing hearing. vx[T]his case haunts me/' she 
said. "I could have done more. I wish there were 
a different result." 
1. Ms. Kreek-Mendez further stated that she believed 
she should have offered testimony from defendant's 
family, friends and employers who would have 
characterized defendant as honest, hardworking and 
trustworthy. According to Ms. Kreek-Mendez, such 
information is important because it "humanize[s]" 
the defendant. 
2. What were counsel's reasons for handling sentencing as 
she did? 
The Court finds that counsel handled sentencing as she 
did for the following reasons: 
a. AP&P offered a favorable recommendation; 
b. The defendant had a minimal criminal history; 
c. The defendant had good family support; 
d. Defendant had been out of custody and done very 
well; 
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e. At the time, counsel was working on two high 
profile sex abuse cases. When counsel compared 
her sex abuse cases to the defendant's case, the 
defendant's case seemed relatively benign by 
comparison. As such, in counsel's mind, prison 
seemed unlikely. 
f. Based on all of the forgoing factors, counsel 
presumed prison was unlikely. As such, counsel 
did not prepare for the sentencing hearing as 
earnestly as she normally would, given the 
severity of the offense, 
g. Ms. Kreek-Mendez stated that her goal at the 
sentencing hearing was to demonstrate that 
defendant was a minor player in the drug 
manufacturing operation with a minimal criminal 
history. She opined that she did a "good job" and 
was "pretty effective." According to Ms. Kreek-
Mendez, the case was pretty clear cut and she 
believes she properly conveyed to the sentencing 
judge that defendant had good qualities, including 
that he was a good father. 
h. Ms. Kreek-Mendez acknowledged that her task was 
not easy. "A lab is the worst thing you can work 
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with. It is the most potential for 
incarceration.'7 Moreover, because defendant's 
crime was a first degree felony, Ms. Kreek Mendez 
believed that "the chances should be the 
presumption of prison on the part of the defense 
attorney." 
Ms. Kreek-Mendez stated that she was involved in 
other demanding cases which she judged to have a 
greater potential for prison time. For that 
reason, she believes she did not devote the time 
needed to properly prepare for defendant's 
sentencing. She also testified that she relied 
too heavily on the presentence report and added 
that the report "was written by, in my opinion, 
the most difficult report writer, someone who 
always recommends substantial incarceration; 
frequently recommends prison. He didn't." 
Ms. Kreek-Mendez indicated that offering testimony 
from defendant's family at the hearing was 
considered, but that such a tactic was 
problematic. For example, Ms. Kreek-Mendez stated 
that having defendant's father testify would be 
difficult because, "I knew they would have to go 
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the bar where his dad was. I knew that one of my 
concerns about his dad was . . . that he was going 
to be sober on the day he testifies. . . . I 
remember lengthy conversations about what kind of 
witness dad would be in trying to help his son. 
He couldn't even be there." 
3. What additional information relevant to sentencing 
could have been discovered by counsel prior to 
sentencing? 
The Court finds that counsel could have discovered the 
following information: 
a. Those letters of recommendation and the 
information contained as represented by exhibits 
1-7; (Specifically, defendant offered seven 
letters from friends and family members which were 
submitted to the Board of Pardons. Ms Kreek-
Mendez stated that the letters were representative 
of the kind of letters she ordinarily solicits for 
sentencing, but failed to do so in this case.) 
b. The details surrounding the death of Mr. Wright's 
mother; 
c. The fact that Mr. Wright had been sexually abused 
as a child and how that abuse affected him; and 
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d. The details about the abuse Mr. Wright suffered at 
the hands of his father. 
4. Was the omission of the additional information 
prejudicial to Mr. Wright at sentencing? 
The Court finds the following: 
a. Judge Pat Brian was the sentencing judge. Judge 
Brian testified that Ms. Kreek-Mendez had 
represented defendants in his court on many 
occasions and that he believed she was an 
excellent attorney. He said that her performance 
at defendant's sentencing hearing was no 
exception. He said he did not find Ms. Kreek-
Mendez' s performance in any way deficient-least of 
all her alleged failure to present testimony from 
defendant's friends and family. 
b. Judge Brian testified that he did not believe 
defendant was a minor player in the clandestine 
lab. He noted that manufacturing paraphernalia 
was found in what defendant admitted was his 
bedroom. Judge Brain also noted that defendant 
was familiar with the location of chemicals and 
waste materials in other parts of the home. 
Finally, the large quantity of methamphetamine and 
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precursor chemicals confiscated from defendant's 
home-and the fact that there were children present 
at the home during the police raid-also weighed 
heavily in favor of a harsh penalty. 
c. These facts, said Judge Brian, led to the 
conclusion that defendant was "up to his armpits'' 
in manufacturing methamphetamine. 
d. Judge Brian stated that because defendant was 
intimately involved the operation, additional 
evidence concerning his character, work ethic and 
family support would not have made any difference 
in the sentence imposed. Judge Brian further 
stated that testimony concerning the death of 
defendant's mother or his alcoholic and abusive 
father would have made no difference because they 
were events that happened nearly 30 years ago and 
could not excuse the serious criminal activity in 
which defendant was involved. Similarly, the 
testimonials of family and friends that defendant 
was a good father, hard-working, reliable, 
trustworthy and caring would have been equally 
unavailing in view of the seriousness of the crime 
of manufacturing methamphetamine. 
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e. Based upon the forgoing, Judge Brian concluded 
that none of the evidence defendant claims should 
have been introduced at his sentencing hearing 
would have resulted in a lesser sentence. 
According to Judge Brian, "He may have been well-
deserving of more than . . . five to life on 
that." 
DATED this ^ day of December, 2002. 
BY THE COURT 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS SCOTT ALAN WRIGHT, 
001912104. 
COUNSEL WILL STATE AN APPEARANCE? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: DEBORAH KREECK-MENDEZ FOR 
MR. WRIGHT. MR. WRIGHT IS PRESENT HERE WITH ME FROM CUSTODY. 
MS. BEATON: BRENDA BEATON FOR THE STATE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. HAVE YOU REVIEWED THE 
PRESENTENCE REPORT? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: I HAVE, YOUR HONOR. I RECEIVED 
IT LAST NIGHT, WENT OVER IT, I CAME OVER EARLY AND WENT OVER IT 
WITH SCOTT TODAY. THERE ARE A FEW CORRECTIONS THAT I WOULD 
LIKE TO MAKE. 
THE COURT: CITE ME CHAPTER AND VERSE IF YOU WILL. 
WE WILL MAKE THE CORRECTIONS. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: LET'S START ON PAGE 5, JUVENILE 
RECORD. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: 2/18 OF '87. 
THE COURT: YES. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: IT SAYS POSSESSION OF 
MARIJUANA/USE, AND THEN IT SAYS 100 POUNDS. WELL, YOUR HONOR, 
THAT'S A BALE. AND I'VE TALKED TO SCOTT, I'VE TALKED TO HIS 
DAD. HE WAS AT SCHOOL AND HE HAD AN EIGHTH. I WILL BE GETTING 
THAT FORMALLY CHANGED, BUT I KNOW WHAT HAPPENS TO JUVENILES 
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THAT HAVE A BALE OF MARIJUANA. AND NONE OF THAT EVER HAPPENED 
IN SCOTT'S FAMILY SO THAT'S JUST NOT ACCURATE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, WE'LL MAKE THE NOTE THAT YOU 
CHALLENGE THAT. AND THE COURT'S NOT GOING TO CONSIDER THAT AS 
PART OF THE SENTENCING. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: OKAY. YOUR HONOR, PAGE 7, IT'S 
MINOR, BUT WE WOULD WANT TO HAVE IT CORRECT. PAGE 7, 
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION. PARAGRAPH 1, SECOND 
SENTENCE. REPORTED HIS FATHER WAS EMPLOYED BY ALLIED WHILE HIS 
MOTHER WORKED AT A BOWLING ALLEY. HIS MOTHER DID NOT WORK. 
IT'S HIS GRANDMOTHER THAT WORKED AT A BOWLING ALLEY. 
THE COURT: THE RECORD WILL BE CORRECTED. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: AND THEN NEXT SENTENCE, HIS 
MOTHER DIED WHEN HE WAS FIVE NOT WHEN HE WAS THREE. 
THE COURT: THE RECORD WILL BE CORRECTED. ALL RIGHT, 
ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: NOT AS FAR AS CORRECTIONS GO. I 
WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN ARGUMENT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE COURT WILL HEAR FIRST 
FROM THE PROSECUTION, THEN FROM DEFENSE COUNSEL, AND THEN FROM 
THE DEFENDANT. 
MS. BEATON: JUDGE, THE STATE'S POSITION IS IS THAT 
THE RECOMMENDATION IS INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE THAT ADULT 
PROBATION HAS PREPARED. THEY'RE RECOMMENDING APPROXIMATELY A 
YEAR IN JAIL AND AN IN-PATIENT COUNSELING AND ODYSSEY HOUSE. 
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AND WHILE ODYSSEY HOUSE IS A GOOD PROGRAM, AND CERTAINLY A YEAR 
IN JAIL IS A SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD OF TIME, THIS DEFENDANT HAS 
PLEADED GUILTY AT THIS POINT TO A FIRST DEGREE FELONY. WHAT'S 
NOT CLEAR FROM THE PRESENTENCE REPORT IS HOW SERIOUS WHAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS DOING, WHAT ACTUALLY THE DEFENDANT'S ROLE IN THIS 
CRIME WAS. I THINK, IF THE COURT HAS ANY CONSIDERATION OR ANY 
TENDENCY, THE RECOMMENDATION BY ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE IS 
NOT CLEAR WHAT'S TAKING PLACE. 
WHEN THE OFFICERS GO IN TO SERVE THIS SEARCH WARRANT 
IN THE NORTHEAST BEDROOM THEY FIND A LAB SET UP AND OPERATING 
AT THAT POINT IN TIME. WHEN THE OFFICERS TALKED TO THE 
DEFENDANT THE DEFENDANT SAYS THAT IS HIS BEDROOM. AND THESE 
ARE THE TYPES OF THINGS THAT ARE FOUND IN THE DEFENDANT'S 
BEDROOM. AND IF I MAY APPROACH? 
THE COURT: HAVE YOU GIVEN A COPY OF THESE DOCUMENTS 
TO DEFENSE COUNSEL? 
MS. BEATON: DEFENSE COUNSEL HAS A COPY OF ALL THE 
PHOTOGRAPHS. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT YOU'RE 
SEEING, THOUGH. 
MS. BEATON: THIS WAS SUBMITTED AT THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING THAT MS. KREEK-MENDEZ HANDLED, AS WELL AS MYSELF. THIS 
IS THE CLAN — 
THE COURT: THIS WILL BE MARKED AS PROSECUTION 1 FOR 
PURPOSES OF SENTENCING. 
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MS. BEATON: AND THE OTHER ONE WAS ALSO ADMITTED, 
WHICH WAS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 3, ORIGINALLY AT PRELIMINARY 
HEARING. 
THE COURT: IT WILL BE MARKED AS PROSECUTION 2 FOR 
PURPOSES OF SENTENCING. 
MS. BEATON: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: YOU MOVE THEIR ADMISSION? 
MS. BEATON: I DO. 
THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THEY ARE BOTH RECEIVED. 
(WHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT NOS. 1 & 2 
WERE OFFERED AND RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE.) 
MS. BEATON: WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AT THIS POINT AS 
STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 1 IS PHOTOGRAPHS OF A CLAN LAB THAT WAS 
FOUND IN THE DEFENDANT'S BEDROOM. YOU CAN SEE THAT THERE'S A 
SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY OF SUBSTANCES. 
THE OTHER ONE IS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 2. IT DEPICTS 
AGAIN ALL OF THE CLAN LAB ITEMS THAT WERE SEIZED IN THIS CASE 
AND ALSO TWO OF THE CHILDREN THAT WERE FOUND INSIDE THE HOME 
WHEN THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS EXECUTED. OBVIOUSLY, THE STATE IS 
CONCERNED BECAUSE THE OFFICERS RARELY GO INTO A SITUATION WHERE 
THE CLAN LAB IS OPERATIONAL. 
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THIS IS A SITUATION WHERE, WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE 
DEFENDANT'S VERSION TO ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE HE WANTS TO 
SAY THE ONLY THING THAT HE'S DOING IN THIS HOME IS THAT HE IS 
THE PERSON WHO WAS RENTING THE HOME, HE HAD JOSH COME INTO HIS 
HOME, THE CO-DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE, AND THAT THE CO-DEFENDANT 
WAS COOKING AND SHOWING HIM HOW TO COOK BUT HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY 
INVOLVEMENT IN IT. 
CLEARLY, THIS IS NOT THE SITUATION GIVEN THE 
STATEMENT THE DEFENDANT TOLD THE OFFICERS ON THAT DATE. HE 
SAID THAT THIS PARTICULAR BEDROOM WHERE THE CLAN LAB WAS FOUND 
IS HIS, HE HAD INDICATED TO THE OFFICERS WHILE HE WAS SITTING 
THERE, AND THE OFFICERS ARE PREPARING TO SEARCH VARIOUS AREAS 
OF THE HOME AND THE GARAGE, HE'S TELLING THE CHILDREN THE 
REASON THAT THE COPS ARE HERE, IT'S BECAUSE IT'S MY FAULT, I'M 
THE REASON THE COPS ARE HERE. I'M SO SORRY. BECAUSE THE 
CHILDREN ARE CRYING AT THE TIME THAT THIS IS TAKING PLACE. 
HE THEN ALSO TALKS TO THE OFFICERS WHEN THEY PUT HIM 
IN A CAR. HE INDICATES A VARIETY OF INFORMATION THAT HE HAS. 
HE'S TALKING ABOUT A JUG THAT'S FOUND AND HE SAYS THAT 
ORIGINALLY IS METH OIL. HE THEN SAYS THAT'S ACTUALLY WASTE 
PRODUCT AND HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH ALL THE WASTE 
PRODUCT. SO HE'S HOLDING ON TO THE WASTE PRODUCT. 
THERE'S ANOTHER JUG OUT IN THE GARAGE THAT'S FOUND 
AND HE SAYS THAT'S WASTE PRODUCT AS WELL AND HE DIDN'T KNOW 
WHAT TO DO WITH IT. 
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THE OFFICER HAS A CONVERSATION WITH THE DEFENDANT 
ABOUT HOW DANGEROUS THIS CRIME IS. CLEARLY, THE DEFENDANT'S 
TALKING ABOUT WASTE PRODUCT. IF HE DIDN'T THINK THAT THIS LAB 
WAS THAT DANGEROUS HE WOULD HAVE DUMPED THE WASTE PRODUCT DOWN 
THE DRAIN. INSTEAD, HE'S HOLDING ON TO IT. IT'S CLEAR TO HIM, 
HE REALLY WASN'T SURE WHAT HE OUGHT TO BE DOING WITH IT. THE 
DEFENDANT SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN DOING THIS. 
IN TERMS OF THE TYPE OF CRIME THAT WE HAVE HERE, ALL 
I DO ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS IS PROSECUTE METH LABS, AND THAT'S 
ALL I'VE DONE EVERY DAY FOR A YEAR PERIOD OF TIME. AND THIS 
DEFENDANT'S GOT A CLAN LAB THAT THEY SEIZE 100 ITEMS FROM IT, 
ALL THREE OF THE PRECURSORS ARE FOUND IN ORDER FOR HIM TO 
MANUFACTURE, AND A SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY OF METHAMPHETAMINE IS 
FOUND. AND FRANKLY, TO TELL YOU THE TRUTH, THIS CASE WOULD 
HAVE BEEN SITTING IN FEDERAL COURT RIGHT NOW BUT FOR THE FACT 
THAT THE OFFICERS, WHEN THEY GOT TO THE SCENE, AND ALL OF THE 
LIQUIDS THAT THEY FOUND, AND ALL THE DIFFERENT QUANTITIES THAT 
THEY FOUND, NONE OF THOSE ITEMS WERE WEIGHED. AND IN ORDER TO 
FILE THIS IN FEDERAL COURT WE WOULD HAVE NEEDED TO KNOW THE 
EXACT AMOUNT OF WEIGHTS OF METHAMPHETAMINE THAT WE HAD ON THE 
SCENE. AND BECAUSE THAT WASN'T DONE THIS CASE GOT FILED IN THE 
STATE COURT. 
THERE'S ALSO REFERENCE IN THE POLICE, IN THE ADULT 
PROBATION AND PAROLE, THAT THERE'S A PROBLEM IN THIS PARTICULAR 
NEIGHBORHOOD AS WELL. THE DEFENDANT WAS RESIDING IN A DUPLEX. 
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AND THE INDIVIDUAL NEXT TO THE DUPLEX IS AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS 
CAUGHT SELLING METHAMPHETAMINE, OF COURSE, WHICH HE'S PROBABLY 
GETTING FROM THE DEFENDANT. AND THE OFFICERS FROM SANDY CITY 
HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE THAT THAT'S WHERE 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS GETTING HIS DRUGS WAS FROM THE DEFENDANT'S 
HOME, BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL WHO OWNS THE DUPLEX, WHO LIVES ON 
THE SIDE OF THE DUPLEX WHERE ORVILLE DORIOUS IS, HE IS THE 
OWNER OF THE DUPLEX, HE, RIGHT NOW, IS IN FEDERAL COURT ON 
CHARGES THAT I'VE INDICTED HIM ON, AND THAT'S FOR DISTRIBUTING 
METHAMPHETAMINE. 
SO, CERTAINLY, THE CONCERN THE STATE HAS IS IN 
ADDITION TO THE FACT WE HAVE AN OPERATIONAL LAB, WE HAVE 
CHILDREN IN THE LAB, AND WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE ALL OF THE DANGERS 
THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS LAB, BUT WE'RE ALSO RUNNING, 
BASICALLY, A SITUATION WHERE THIS WHOLE NEIGHBORHOOD IS A 
NUISANCE BECAUSE THE DUPLEX OWNER IS RENTING TO SCOTTY WRIGHT, 
WHO HE KNOWS SCOTTY WRIGHT IS MANUFACTURING METHAMPHETAMINE, 
PROVIDING HIM PRODUCTS SO HE CAN TURN AROUND AND SELL. AND SO 
WE HAVE A NICE LITTLE (SOMEBODY COUGHED) TAKING PLACE IN THIS 
DUPLEX WHERE JOSH CORBETT ADMITS HE'S SELLING DRUGS, HE'S BEEN 
DOING THAT FOR A YEAR. HE, OF COURSE, JUST HAPPENS TO MOVE IN 
WITH SCOTTY WRIGHT. WE HAVE ALL OF THESE LAB ITEMS FOUND IN 
THIS PARTICULAR HOME. 
AND IT'S THE STATE'S RECOMMENDATION THAT AT A VERY 
MINIMUM THIS SHOULD BE A SITUATION WHERE THE DEFENDANT SHOULD 
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GO OUT TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON ON A 60-DAY EVALUATION IN ORDER 
TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT THEY THINK, AFTER THEY CONSIDER ALL OF 
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE, WHETHER OR NOT THEY THINK HE OUGHT TO 
BE PLACED AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON. BUT FRANKLY, IT'S THE 
STATE'S POSITION THAT THIS IS THE TYPE OF CRIME, IN AND OF 
ITSELF, IRREGARDLESS OF ALL OF THE OTHER HISTORY THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAS, HIS HISTORY IN JUVENILE COURT, HIS HISTORY IN 
THE FELONY, IN THE ADULT SYSTEM AT THIS POINT, HIS PRIOR DRUG 
USE, AND ALL OF THE CONCERNS THAT WE HAVE, THIS IS NOT A 
SITUATION WHERE THIS DEFENDANT IS JUST A USER OF DRUGS, THIS IS 
NOT A SITUATION WHERE THIS DEFENDANT CAN STAND HERE AND CLAIM 
THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON IN HIS BEDROOM, IN HIS 
HOME, HUH-UH. AND IT'S THE STATE'S POSITION HE SHOULD BE 
PLACED AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON. WE WOULD ALSO ASK FOR 
RESTITUTION FOR THE CLEAN-UP COSTS THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH 
THIS LAB, WHICH ARE CONSIDERABLE, WHICH ARE IN EXCESS OF 
$4,000.00. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. COUNSEL? 
MS. BEATON: JUST ONE OTHER THING I WANTED TO MENTION 
TOO. I NOTICE THAT WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS IN THE JAIL PENDING 
ON THIS PARTICULAR CASE HE APPARENTLY GETS RECLASSIFIED WHILE 
HE IS IN THE JAIL BECAUSE EVEN WHILE HE'S PENDING THIS CASE 
HE'S TRYING TO MAKE ALCOHOL WHILE HE'S SITTING IN THE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY JAIL. AND OBVIOUSLY, HIS CONDUCT WOULD INDICATE THAT HE 
DOESN'T CONSIDER THIS TO BE A SERIOUS MATTER. 
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THE COURT: WELL, THE RECORD INDICATES HE'S NOT ONLY 
TRYING — 
MS. BEATON: THAT HE'S MAKING. 
THE COURT: HE MADE IT. AND THAT HE CAME TO BE THE 
OBJECT OF A DISCIPLINARY ACTION. THE DEFENDANT WAS PLACED IN 
MEDIUM SECURITY AFTER RECEIVING A DISCIPLINARY ACTION FOR 
MAKING HOOCH. "HOMEMADE BOOZE." 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: YOUR HONOR, SCOTT'S READY TO TALK 
TO YOU ABOUT THAT CAUSE I THINK HE CAN BETTER RESPOND TO THAT. 
IT'S NOT UNCOMMON. AND THAT'S NOT AN EXCUSE, IT'S JUST VERY 
PREVALENT. 
I'D LIKE TO START WITH SOME OF MS. BEATON'S COMMENTS. 
THERE IS A PROBLEM IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD BUT SCOTTY WRIGHT IS 
NOT WHERE THAT PROBLEM INITIATED. ORVILLE DORIOUS IS SITTING 
IN FEDERAL PRISON. THERE WAS A LAB BUST AT THIS HOUSE MONTHS 
BEFORE, MONTHS BEFORE SCOTT WAS EVEN IN THE PICTURE. AND, IN 
FACT, WHEN I WAS TALKING TO THE OFFICERS TO SORT THIS OUT, I 
COULDN'T FIGURE THAT PART OF IT OUT. AND THE OFFICER TOLD ME 
THAT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH SCOTT. THEY CLEANED THAT HOUSE UP 
AND THEN MORE PEOPLE THAT ARE INVOLVED IN METHAMPHETAMINE MOVED 
IN. THAT'S WHAT THE OFFICER TOLD ME IN THE HALL WHEN I WAS 
TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT THAT HAD TO DO WITH SCOTT. NOTHING. 
IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH SCOTT. OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT 
SOMEBODY, MY POSITION IS, PROBABLY MR. DORIOUS, KEPT THINGS 
MOVING IN THAT HOUSE TO KEEP HIS BUSINESS GOING. 
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SCOTT IS NOT THE PERSON WHO WAS STOPPED. THE WAY 
THIS BUST WENT DOWN IS THE OFFICER DID A TRAFFIC STOP. THE 
PERSON THAT WAS STOPPED THERE SAID, WELL, I'M GOING WITH A 
FRIEND TO FIND WORK. THERE IS DRUG PARAPHERNALIA; THERE'S 
DRUGS. THERE'S A LITTLE, WHAT OFFICERS FEEL LIKE PROBABLY 
THERE IS A MEETING AT THE CONVENIENCE STORE FOR SOMETHING MORE. 
THEY GO AND THEY FOLLOW JOSH CORBETT. JOSH CORBETT, IN FACT, 
WAS GOING TO SELL DRUGS, NOT SCOTT WRIGHT. JOSH CORBETT THE 
SAYS TO THE OFFICERS, WELL, I GOT A LAB BACK AT THE HOUSE. AND 
HE SAID ALL THESE THINGS ABOUT SCOTT WRIGHT, WHICH HE, AT THIS 
TIME, IS A CO-DEFENDANT THAT IS BEING LET GO, TO WALK OFF, TO 
GO DO WHATEVER HE WANTS TO DO AT THAT TIME. THERE IS, IN FACT, 
A LAB THERE WHEN THEY SEARCH FOR THE WARRANT. THEY DID A LOT 
OF WORK ON THIS CASE, YOUR HONOR. BECAUSE I STRUGGLED WITH IT. 
AND I KNOW WHAT I BELIEVE, NOT CRITICAL, BUT I REALLY BELIEVE 
THAT SCOTT WAS A MINOR ROLE. BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN HE WASN'T 
GUILTY. AND SCOTT AND I DID A LOT OF WORK ABOUT THIS. THIS IS 
A BROAD STATUTE, YOU PROVIDE A PLACE TO COOK, YOU GET PAID OFF 
IN DRUGS, YOU'RE GUILTY. 
THE COURT: DO YOU BELIEVE THAT? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: I DO BELIEVE THAT. I DO BELIEVE 
THAT. I BELIEVE THAT THAT IS WHAT IT IS. AND I HAVE STRUGGLED 
BECAUSE I DON'T — THE STATUTE IS SO BROAD, YOUR HONOR. WE,, IN 
OUR OFFICE HAVE GONE OVER IT BACKWARDS AND FORWARDS. IF YOU 
ARE A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE, IF YOU, IN ANY WAY KNOW THAT THIS 
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CHILDREN. HE DIDN'T KNOW THEY WERE THERE AND SHE DIDN'T KNOW 
THAT THERE WAS A LAB THERE. HE DID TAKE RESPONSIBILITY. IT'S 
MY DRUG ACTIVITY THAT CAUSED THE POLICE TO BE HERE, THAT CAUSED 
THIS PROBLEM. AND HE WANTED THE KIDS TO BE CALM. HE WAS 
TRYING TO EASE THEM. AND HE DOES TAKE RESPONSIBILITY. 
YOUR HONOR, I HAVE INTERVIEWED MANY, MANY WITNESSES. 
I HAVE PULLED UP RECORDS. JOSH CORBETT HAS THREE CLAN LABS AT 
THIS TIME, DATING ONE BEFORE AND ONE AFTER THIS INCIDENT. HE 
HAS --MR. DORIOUS HAS HIS FEDERAL CHARGES. SCOTT'S RECORD IS 
HERE BEFORE YOU. AND WHILE IT'S NOT WHAT I WOULD WANT IT TO BE 
IT IS NOT AS BAD AS WE USUALLY SEE BEFORE US. 
YOUR HONOR, SCOTT'S BEEN IN JAIL FOR A LONG TIME. IT 
IS THE FIRST TIME HIS HEAD HAS BEEN CLEARED SINCE HIS WIFE LEFT 
HIM IN '98. DRUGS PLAYED A ROLE IN THAT, BUT HE JUST WENT OFF 
THE DEEP END AT THAT POINT. HE STILL WORKED. HE'S 
CONSISTENTLY WORKED. HE PAID CHILD SUPPORT WHEN HIS WIFE WENT 
ON, GOT INVOLVED WITH THE WELFARE SYSTEM, AND I'M NOT SURE AT 
WHAT LEVEL, O.R.S. WAS GARNISHING 50 PERCENT OF HIS WAGES AND 
HE WAS PAYING THAT. NOW, IN THE RECENT MONTHS, PRIOR TO BEING 
IN CUSTODY ON THIS, HE WASN'T WORKING AS MUCH. HE WAS PICKING 
UP ODD JOBS. HE HAD FALLEN DOWN. 
BUT, YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE A YOUNG MAN HERE. HE HAS A 
WORK HISTORY. HE HAS A GOOD WORK HISTORY AND HE HAS SKILLS. 
AND EVEN IN ALL OF HIS STUPIDITY, WHEN I TALKED TO HIS FAMILY, 
TALKED TO EVERYONE, HE WAS STILL AN EMOTIONAL FATHER FOR HIS 
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1 IS HAPPENING AND CONTRIBUTE TO IT IN ANY WAY, I THINK THE 
2 STATUTE IS BROAD, AND AS YET IT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, BUT 
3 I'M STILL WORKING ON THAT ELEMENT OF IT. 
4 BUT WE HAD THIS SET FOR A MOTION. WE CAME IN. AND 
5 IN GETTING READY FOR THE MOTION I TALKED WITH SCOTT'S FATHER 
6 AMD HIS FAMILY. SCOTT HAD BEEN MOVING OUT OF THAT HOUSE. HE 
7 WAS SCARED ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THERE BUT HE WAS ALSO 
8 VERY ADDICTED AND VERY MUCH STILL USING THE DRUGS. HE HADN'T 
9 STAYED THERE THE NIGHT BEFORE THIS HAPPENED. HIS FATHER HAD 
10 BEEN THERE WITH HIM MOVING ALL OF HIS STUFF OUT OF THAT ROOM. 
11 WHEN HE CAME BACK THE LAST TIME TO TAKE THE LAST LOAD OF STUFF, 
12 AND WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE PICTURES THERE'S NOT, IT'S NOT A 
13 LIVED-IN ROOM. THERE'S NOT A PLACE FOR HIM TO BE. THERE'S 
14 SOME, I THINK THERE IS A FISHING POLE AND A TOOL CHEST OF HIS 
15 LEFT IN THERE. AND THERE'S A LOCK ON THE DOOR. 
16 AT THE PRELIM WE SPENT A LOT OF TIME TALKING ABOUT 
17 THE FACT THE DOOR APPEARED TO BE KICKED IN, BUT THE OFFICER 
18 WASN'T SURE WHO TOOK THAT PICTURE OR WHO KICKED IT IN, BUT 
19 THERE IS A HOLE IN THE DOOR WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE DOOR. 
20 HE HAD GONE OUT TO THE GARAGE AND ASKED ORVILLE, 
21 WHILE HE WAS IN THE GARAGE, AND I THINK THESE PICTURES WITH THE 
22 KIDS THERE ARE INFLAMMATORY BECAUSE HIS GIRLFRIEND HAD COME IN 
23 WHILE HE WAS OUT IN THE GARAGE TALKING TO MR. DORIOUS ABOUT WHY 
24 HIS DOOR WAS LOCKED. MR. DORIOUS IS SAYING BECAUSE I WANT MY 
25 MONEY. SHE CAME IN, SHE CAME IN TO THE HOUSE WITH THE 
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CHILDREN. TOWARDS THE END HE WASN'T FINANCIALLY THERE BUT HE 
HAD BEEN THERE BEFORE. 
I KNOW THIS CASE IS BAD, BUT HIS ROLE IN IT IS 
DIFFERENT THAN JOSH CORBETT'S. JOSH CORBETT IS A PERSON THAT 
IS AT A GAS STATION, FOR WHAT I WOULD PURPORT THERE IS NO 
EVIDENCE, AND YOU GOT TO GIVE IT THE WEIGHT THE COURT REQUIRES, 
BUT IT LOOKS LIKE HE'S THERE TO GIVE THIS OTHER GUY A DRUG 
DEAL. AND HE'S OUT. HE'S OUT ON, HE WAS OUT, HE GOT OFF OF 
THE FIRST LAB --
MS. BEATON: HE'S ON WARRANT. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: HE'S NOT ON WARRANT NOW, HE'S IN 
JAIL NOW. 
THE COURT: JUST A MOMENT. YOU'RE ENTITLED TO SAY 
WHATEVER YOU WANT WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. GO AHEAD. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: OKAY. YOUR HONOR, HE HAD A LAB 
AND GOT OUT. THERE'S TWO WAYS YOU GET OUT WHEN YOU HAVE A LAB, 
YOU'RE A STELLAR CITIZEN, BUT FOR THAT, YOU BAIL --SO THERE'S 
FOUR WAYS — YOU TELL, YOU GIVE INFORMATION, YOU PROVIDE THE 
POLICE WITH SOMEONE ELSE, WHICH I WOULD BET IS WHAT JOSH 
CORBETT*S ENTIRE PLAN WAS IN THIS. 
HE DID HAVE A WARRANT FOR A LONG TIME AND THEN HE WAS 
RECENTLY PICKED UP AND SENT SCOTT A LETTER, WHICH SCOTT 
PROMPTLY SAID TO ME, LOOK, THIS WILL DO IT. AND IT SAYS, MAN, 
I'M SORRY YOU'RE IN THIS MESS, I'M SORRY I GOT YOU IN THIS 
MESS, I'LL DO ANYTHING FOR YOU. WHICH I SAID, WELL, THAT AND A 
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DOLLAR WILL GET YOU A CUP OF COFFEE, CAUSE THAT'S NOT WORTH 
ANYTHING TO THE COURT. BUT IT DOES TELL ME THAT JOSH DOES HAVE 
A ROLE IN ALL OF THIS, HE HAS A BIGGER ROLE THAN SCOTT. 
WE GOT THREE ROWS OF PEOPLE HERE OF FAMILY THAT ARE 
SUPPORTIVE. SCOTT DOESN'T COME FROM A CLEAN BACKGROUND. HE 
HAD A HARD TIME OF IT. HIS MOTHER DIED. HIS FATHER HAS BEEN 
INVOLVED WITH METHAMPHETAMINE AND HAS HAD TO REALLY FIGHT IT. 
HE'S REALLY IMPROVED AND HE WORKED REALLY HARD TO BE ABLE TO 
PROVIDE ME AND WORK WITH ME IN THIS CASE. SCOTT CAN SEE THAT 
SOMEONE CAN DO THAT, THEY CAN PULL OUT OF IT. IT'S NOT BEEN 
EASY. HIS DAD IS A LONG, LONG-TERM ALCOHOLIC AND THE METH. 
YOUR HONOR, I DON'T BELIEVE A DIAGNOSTIC IS 
NECESSARY. WE HAVE A REALLY SERIOUS DRUG ADDICT. HE'S GOING 
TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT THE ALCOHOL. IT IS A PROBLEM. I KNOW 
THAT. BUT I WOULD ASK YOU, YOUR HONOR, TO GIVE HIM THE YEAR IN 
JAIL BUT LET HIM BE RELEASED WHEN THERE'S A BED AVAILABLE. AND 
YOUR HONOR, I WOULD ASK YOU TO LEAVE IT TO THE P.O. THAT'S 
ASSIGNED. WE HAVE HIM SCREENED FOR FIRST STEP. AND 
REALISTICALLY, HE'S FINE TO GO TO ODYSSEY. AND WE HAVE HIM SET 
UP FOR THAT. 
HE HAS A CONCERN ABOUT HIS CHILDREN, ABOUT 
FINANCIALLY AND EMOTIONALLY SUPPORTING THEM. I WOULD PREFER HE 
BE AT FIRST STEP HOUSE. HIS SISTER THINKS HE NEEDS A YEAR OF 
TREATMENT. FIRST STEP CAN PROVIDE THAT FOR HIM BECAUSE HE WILL 
DO THE IN-PATIENT PART OF IT. THAT'LL BE FOUR TO SIX MONTHS, 
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DEPENDING ON HIS SUCCESS, THEN HE'LL DO THE AFTER CARE. THEY 
SLOWLY WORK HIM BACK INTO THE COMMUNITY, WHICH IS CRITICAL WITH 
METHAMPHETAMINE, WHICH WORKS ON COMMUNITY TRIGGERS. 
THIS IS A YOUNG MAN WHO HAS WORKED REALLY HARD WITH 
ME ON THIS CASE. HE HASN'T BEEN, IT HASN'T BEEN AN ATTITUDE OF 
I DON'T CARE, OR I'M NOT PART OF THIS, OR I'M NOT RESPONSIBLE, 
IT'S, I JUST WANT THE JUDGE TO KNOW WHAT I'M REALLY RESPONSIBLE 
FOR. AND I ARGUE THAT THIS, IN FACT, IS WHAT HE IS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR. THERE WAS A LAB THERE BUT HE DIDN'T PUT THAT THERE AND HE 
DIDN'T SET IT UP THERE, BUT HE SURE TOOK IN THE PROCEEDS AND 
ALLOWED IT TO HAPPEN AND ALLOWED IT TO CONTINUE ON. AND HE PUT 
HIMSELF AROUND PEOPLE. AND HE'S CUT THOSE TIES. IT'S HIS 
FAMILY WHO IS HERE TODAY, IT'S NOT THOSE FRIENDS. IT'S HIS 
FAMILY, WHO, HE'S BURNED THEM MORE TIMES THAN HE WANTS TO 
REMEMBER. HIS COMMENTS TO ME IS THEY ARE THE PEOPLE THAT 
THROUGH IT ALL, THROUGH MY ATTITUDE, THROUGH MY EVERYTHING, 
HAVE BEEN SITTING THERE, WERE THERE FOR ME. THEY ARE AREN'T 
AFRAID TO CONFRONT HIM. IT'S AMAZING TO ME HOW QUICKLY THEY'LL 
CALL HIM ON HIS LITTLE B.S. THAT HE HAS. 
I WOULD ASK YOU TO PLEASE GIVE HIM THE TIME IN JAIL 
BUT LET HIM GET OUT WHEN THERE'S A BED, WHICH COULD BE A WHILE, 
ESPECIALLY IF YOU DETERMINE THAT ODYSSEY IS APPROPRIATE. HE 
WILL DO THE DIAGNOSTIC BUT I THINK WE ARE GOING TO HAVE SIMILAR 
RESULTS. HE HAS WORKED HARD BUT FOR THE MAKING ALCOHOL IN THE 
JAIL. HE IS NOT A BEHAVIOR PROBLEM, HE'S NOT A DISCIPLINE 
18 
PROBLEM, AND PROBABLY WILL, AFTER HIS PUNISHMENT PERIOD'S OVER, 
BE RECLASSIFIED BACK TO MINIMUM IN MY EXPERIENCE. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING THE DEFENDANT WOULD LIKE TO SAY? 
THE DEFENDANT: YEAH, YOUR HONOR. AS FAR AS THE 
HOOCH INCIDENT'S CONCERNED. 
THE COURT: THAT'S A NO BRAINER WITH THE COURT. 
LET'S MOVE ON. 
THE DEFENDANT: ALL RIGHT. I'D JUST LIKE TO SAY THAT 
I KNOW HOW IT ALL APPEARS. 
THE COURT: HOW DOES IT APPEAR? 
THE DEFENDANT: WELL, IT APPEARS THAT — 
THE COURT: TELL ME, INASMUCH AS YOU HAVE OPENED UP 
THE DIALOGUE WITH THE COURT, WHOSE BEDROOM WAS ALL THE STUFF 
THAT'S SET FORTH IN THE EXHIBIT 1 OWNED BY? 
THE DEFENDANT: IT WAS THE BEDROOM THAT I OCCUPIED. 
THE COURT: NO. 2, HOW LONG HAD YOU BEEN A RESIDENT 
OF THAT HOUSE? 
THE DEFENDANT: TWO MONTHS. 
THE COURT: NO. 3, HOW MANY BEDROOMS IN THE HOUSE? 
THE DEFENDANT: THREE. 
THE COURT: HOW MANY OCCUPANTS IN THE HOUSE? 
THE DEFENDANT: THREE. 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD AND SAY WHAT YOU'D LIKE. 
THE DEFENDANT: WELL, I'D JUST LIKE TO SAY THAT AS 
FAR AS THE POLICE, THAT SAID THAT I TOLD 'EM WHERE THINGS WERE 
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OR WHAT NOT, I WAS INTERROGATED FOR SIX HOURS IN THE GARAGE AND 
I DID LET 'EM KNOW WHAT I KNEW ABOUT WHERE THINGS WERE. AS FAR 
AS JOSH HAD TOLD ME. AND THERE WAS A LOCK ON MY DOOR. I 
HADN'T BEEN IN THAT ROOM AND SEEN ANY LAB SET UP. I DIDN'T 
KNOW IT WAS IN THERE OR I WOULDN'T HAVE CLAIMED IT AS MY ROOM. 
I WASN'T ON THE LEASE AND IT'S REALLY, IT'S REALLY NOT MY GIG, 
YOUR HONOR. I KNOW IT LOOKS THAT WAY AND THE PROSECUTION'S 
MAKING IT OUT TO BE THAT WAY, BUT I JUST HOPE YOU CAN SEE ME 
FOR WHO I AM AND KNOW THAT I DESERVE A SECOND CHANCE. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: YOUR HONOR, I WILL NOTE ONE 
POINT. HE DID HAVE A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AS TO THE COOKING 
PROCESSES AS I TRIED TO WORK, TO TALK TO HIM, AND I KNOW IT 
DOESN'T TAKE AN EINSTEIN TO MAKE METHAMPHETAMINE, BUT IN MY 
CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM IT DEFINITELY WAS SOMEONE ON THE 
PERIPHERY HAD GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, HE EVEN CALLED THE STUFF IN 
THE JUGS WHEN HE TOLD THE OFFICER THERE'S SOME STUFF THAT I 
THINK THAT'S DANGEROUS, HE CALLED IT METH OIL, AND IN FACT IT 
WASN'T METH OIL IT'S METH WASTE. 
THE COURT: NEVERTHELESS, DANGEROUS. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: DANGEROUS, BUT IT KINDA SUPPORTS 
THAT HE DID HAVE A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE, WHICH I KNOW THAT'S A 
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD BECAUSE MESSING WITH THIS STUFF WITH A LACK 
OF KNOWLEDGE IS DANGEROUS BUT IT'S NOT SOMETHING HE'S GOING TO 
PROLIFERATE. AND HE IS NOT ONE OT THESE PEOPLE THAT GETS HIGH 
OFF OF THE HIGH OF COOKING. HE IS SOMEONE, IF YOU GIVE HIM A 
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SHOT AT THIS HE'S GOING TO DO IT. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ANYBODY ELSE WOULD LIKE TO SAY? 
MS. BEATON: ALSO, HE IDENTIFIED THE VENT BAG IN THE 
GARAGE AND TOLD THE OFFICERS THEY SHOULD BE CAREFUL OF THAT AS 
WELL. THE SITUATION, TO CLARIFY WITH JOSH CORBETT, HE WAS OUT 
ON BENCH WARRANT AND THE COPS WERE LOOKING FOR HIM. HE WAS 
ORIGINALLY ARRESTED AND RELEASED ON SOME SORT OF RELEASE 
ARRANGEMENT AND THEN OUT ON BENCH WARRANT SO HE HASN'T BEEN 
RUNNING THE STREETS, HE HASN'T PROVIDED ANY COOPERATION, AND 
HE'S CURRENTLY SET FOR TRIAL ON THIS SAME CHARGE RIGHT NOW. 
ORVILLE DORIOUS IS NOT IN FEDERAL PRISON AT THIS 
POINT. HE'S CURRENTLY PENDING ON HIS CHARGES. AND HIS M.O. IS 
HE LIKES TO RENT TO COOKS. DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT THE 
CHARGES THAT HE HAS THAT WAS DURING THE TENURE WHEN SCOTT 
WRIGHT WAS IN THE DUPLEX NEXT TO HIM, NOT THE OTHER CLAN LAB 
COOK THAT HE HAD RENTED TO PREVIOUSLY. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MS. BEATON: THAT'S IT. 
THE COURT: ANY LEGAL REASON WHY SENTENCE SHOULD NOT 
BE IMPOSED? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: EVERYONE HAS TAKEN A GENEROUS AMOUNT OF 
TIME IN EXPLAINING THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON THE CASE. LET 
THE COURT, UNLESS THERE'S TOO MUCH READING BETWEEN THE LINES 
GOING ON BY THE COURT, EXPLAIN ITS POSITION. 
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1 IN THE FIRST PLACE, IF YOU STARTED WITH THE MOST 
2 FUNDAMENTAL OF ALL FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS, EVEN THOUGH THIS HOUSE 
3 HAD THREE BEDROOMS, IT WAS THE DEFENDANT•S HOUSE, AS FAR AS THE 
4 BEDROOM IN IT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED IT, THERE'S NO DISPUTE ABOUT 
5 THE OWNERSHIP OF THE BEDROOM, AND IT'S NOT UNCOMMON FOR THREE 
6 OR FOUR OR FIVE ADULTS TO RENT A HOUSE AND EACH ONE OF THEM 
7 STAKE OUT THEIR OWN LITTLE BAILIWICK INSIDE THE HOUSE AND USE 
8 COMMON AREAS BETWEEN THEM. BUT THE BEDROOM GENERALLY IS AN OFF 
9 LIMITS PLACE. GENERALLY. 
10 IT DEFIES LOGIC AND IT DEFIES REASON FROM THE COURT'S 
11 POINT OF VIEW THAT THE DEFENDANT NOT ONLY WAS EXTREMELY MINDFUL 
12 AND AWARE OF WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE HOUSE, IN HIS BEDROOM, 
13 BUT HE ACQUIESCED AND PARTICIPATED. IF SOMEBODY RENTED A HOUSE 
14 AND PAID THEIR FAIR SHARE OF THE RENT AND A CO-TENANT BROUGHT 
15 ALL THAT STUFF IN AND STUCK IT IN HIS BEDROOM AND HE DIDN'T 
16 WANT IT THERE, THE FIRST THING HE'D DO IS PUNCH THE CO-TENANT, 
17 CALL THE POLICE, ROUND THE STUFF UP AND THROW IT IN A DUMPSTER. 
18 AND THAT JUST SIMPLY ISN'T WHAT HAPPENED HERE. 
19 BEYOND THAT, METH IS A DIRTY, UGLY, DESPICABLE, 
20 DEPLORABLE BUSINESS. IT'S NOT MADE FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSUMPTION, 
21 IT'S MADE FOR DISTRIBUTION. IT IS POISON THAT CAN BE COOKED BY 
22 ANYBODY THAT HAS A MODEST AMOUNT OF INTELLIGENCE THAT CAN READ. 
23 THE RECIPES ARE PUBLISHED ON THE INTERNET. AND IT'S NOT LIKE 
24 GROWING EIGHT OR 10 MARIJUANA PLANTS AND HARVESTING THOSE 
25 PLANTS PERIODICALLY FOR YOUR OWN USE. WHEN PEOPLE START 
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COOKING THIS STUFF THEY KNOW TWO THINGS. IT'S A POISON THAT IS 
IN HIGH DEMAND AND IT IS A POISON THAT HAS A HIGH MARGIN OF 
PROFIT. IT COSTS LITTLE OR NOTHING TO MAKE IT AND THE PROFIT 
IS ABSOLUTELY MIND-BOGGLING. AND IT JUST MAKES THE WHOLE 
NOTION OF COOKING THAT MUCH MORE DESPICABLE. ANYBODY WITH A 
HUNDRED BUCKS, 50.00 BUCKS, OR WHATEVER THE GOING PRICE IS ON A 
GIVEN MORNING CAN KNOCK ON THE DOOR AND KNOW THERE'S A FRESH 
BATCH THAT'S BEEN COOKED AND THEY LAY THE QUID PRO QUO ON THE 
PALM OF THE HAND, THIS STUFF IS IN THE OTHER HAND, AND THEY'RE 
OUT OF THE DOOR AND ON THEIR WAY. 
THE PROBLEM IS WITH WHAT IS SO ABSOLUTELY GLARING IN 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 2 THAT WAS ADMITTED FOR PURPOSES OF 
THIS SENTENCING, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SOPHISTICATION OF THE 
CHEF, THIS STUFF IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS. AND YOU CAN PICK UP A 
NEWSPAPER AND PRACTICALLY ON A DAILY BASIS SOME PLACE, ONE OF 
THESE THINGS GOES SOUTH AND A FIRE STARTS OR A CONTAMINATION 
GETS SPREAD. AND WHAT DO THESE KIDS KNOW ABOUT IT? THEY'RE 
THERE EXPOSED TO ALL OF THE STUFF THAT GOES ON. THEY DON'T 
HAVE THE SOPHISTICATION THAT EITHER A DETECTIVE OR DEFENDANT 
CAN DEFEND THEMSELVES FROM IT. THE STUFF, FIRST AND FOREMOST, 
IS UGLY TO THE PEOPLE WHO USE IT AND THEN IT CONTAMINATES THE 
PEOPLE IN THE HOUSE, IT CONTAMINATES THE PEOPLE IN THE 
NEIGHBORHOOD, IT CONTAMINATES THE PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY. AND 
IF I'M THE ONLY ONE IN THIS ENTIRE COURTROOM THAT HAS MADE THAT 
DEDUCTION SO BE IT. THAT IS MY OPINION. 
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AND I DON'T BUY INTO THIS NOTION THAT THE DEFENDANT 
WAS EQUIVALENT TO THOSE THREE MONKEYS THAT WE READ ABOUT 
PERIODICALLY, THEY SEE NOTHING, THEY HEAR NOTHING, THEY SPEAK 
NOTHING. I'M NOT BUYING IT. 
AND WE KNOW FOR SURE THAT FOR WHATEVER REASON HE WAS 
GETTING ENOUGH OF THIS STUFF FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL USE. I MEAN, 
THERE HAD TO BE SOME QUID PRO QUO SOME PLACE ALONG THE WAY. 
IT'S A VERY COLD, IT'S A VERY CALLOUS, IT'S A VERY CALCULATING, 
UGLY SUBCULTURE AND PEOPLE UP AND DOWN THIS STREET AND UP AND 
DOWN THE STREETS OF EVERY TOWN IN THE UNITED STATES SEEM TO BE 
EITHER DIRECTLY OR TANGENTIALLY VICTIMIZED WITH THIS. THE TAX 
PAYERS IN THIS CASE HAVE A $4,000.00 BILL BECAUSE POLICE 
OFFICERS HAVE TO DRESS UP LIKE ASTRONAUTS AND GO INTO THAT 
APARTMENT AND CLEAN IT UP. THIS STUFF IS SO HIGHLY 
CONTAMINATED THAT THEY'RE NOT GOING TO SMELL IT, THEY'RE NOT 
GOING TO TOUCH IT, THEY'RE NOT GOING TO STEP IN IT. THEY DRESS 
UP LIKE THEY'RE GOING TO MARS TO DEAL WITH IT. WHAT KIND OF 
PROTECTION DO THE KIDS HAVE? THEY RUN AROUND BAREFOOTED WITH 
A SHIRT AND A PAIR OF PANTS ON. IT IS JUST ABSOLUTELY 
DESPICABLE. 
I'VE READ THE PRESENTENCE REPORT CAREFULLY. I AM 
CONVINCED THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS IN THIS MESS UP TO HIS EARS. 
AND I HAVE READ NOR HEARD NOTHING TODAY THAT CAUSES ME TO THINK 
TO THE CONTRARY. 
HE'S BEEN CONVICTED OF A FIRST DEGREE FELONY. NO 
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LEGAL REASON HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WHY SENTENCE SHOULD NOT BE 
IMPOSED. HE'S COMMITTED TO THE UTAH STATE PENITENTIARY FOR THE 
TERM PRESCRIBED BY LAW. HE IS FINED $10,000.00 AND THE MAXIMUM 
SURCHARGE IS IMPOSED. HE IS ORDERED TO PAY THE CLEANUP FEE 
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, IF SOMEBODY ELSE IS INVOLVED IN THAT 
PROCESS. AND IT IS MY HOPE THAT THIS MORNING, THE WORD GOES 
OUT, IF YOU COOK IN THIS TOWN AND YOU COME TO MY COURT YOU'RE 
GOING TO PRISON. 
TAKE HIM AWAY. 
(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED). 
* * * 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R., DO CERTIFY THAT I AM A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER AND OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN AND 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT AS SUCH REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND PLACE 
SET OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN THE TESTIMONY GIVEN 
AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND THAT THEREAFTER MY NOTES 
WERE TRANSCRIBED BY COMPUTER INTO THE FOREGOING PAGES; AND THAT 
THIS CONSTITUTES A FULL, TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE 
SAME. 
at^.,QLiM^ CM. 
EILEEN/M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
ADDENDUM C 
Gregory K. Orme 
Presiding Judge 
©tat) Court of Appeal* 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
801-57&-3900 
FAX M1-57S-3999 
January 8, 1996 
Annina M. Mitchell 
Deputy Solicitor General 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Dear Annina: 
In response to your letter dated December 5, 1995, we have 
reviewed our experience with the referenced rule and are of the 
view that the rule is not in need of an overhaul. The rule was 
never intended to apply to all appeals raising ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, but only to those where some 
limited evidentiary development was necessary to decide 
particular claims. Nonetheless, in the years that the rule has 
been in effect, this court has received 25 motions to remand 
pursuant to the rule and has granted only three. While this 
statistic probably suggests the rule is misunderstood or 
overused, we believe efforts aimed at education of both judges 
and attorneys hold more promise than revision of the rule. We 
think the rule is actually clear and quite workable. 
That having been said, we believe there are two areas where 
you might consider modest revisions to the rule. First, you 
might at least consider whether it would be helpful to provide in 
the rule a deadline by which the remand proceeding would have to 
be concluded, absent some explanation from the trial court and/or 
the attorneys as to why more time was needed. Second, you might 
consider deleting the rather arbitrary prohibition on the trial 
court1s making conclusions of law. While we understand the 
rationale behind that proscription, it poses a couple of 
difficulties. It is not always clear what constitutes a finding 
of fact, conclusion of law, or a mixed question, and we would not 
want to miss the opportunity for some helpful insight that could 
be offered by the trial court but which was withheld out of 
concern that it might run afoul of the prohibition on making 
conclusions of law. Also, at least in those cases where the 
judge dealing with the matter on remand is the judge who presided 
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over the original trial, his or her insight on whether any 
deficient performance actually resulted in prejudice could be 
extremely helpful to the appellate court. 
Again, aside from your possibly considering these two areas, 
we believe the rule is well-drafted, serves the limited purposes 
intended, and provides for a workable, straightforward procedure. 
Very truly 
GKO/bcs 
